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CAUSES WHICH L E D  TO PRE.ESIIP\EXCE OB 
NATIONS I N  WAR. 
By Captain 0sc.w DC TIIOBES, L p . ,  3Stli Regiment. 
‘‘ Virtulc c t  Tdorc.” 
ISEQUILITT in thc physical, intellectual, and moral status of mail is as 
much a condition of his esistcncc as it is a fact palpable to thc 
pcrceptions of all men. If we look n t  thc progress of ar t  and scienco 
all orer the i-rorld, or inquirc as to the social and educational ndvancc- 
mcnt of the diffcrcnt bixnchcs of thc human race, 3j-e find an almost 
infinite number of gradations-a series of gradations from wherc is  
shadow and darkness to whcrc is tlrilight and light. That this 
applies ni th  equal forcc to thc state of the 31-orld of antiquitS, cannot 
perhaps be affirmed. The advcnt and progrcss of Christiauity leading 
a ncii- order of cirilization by tho hand ; thc n-ondcrful inrcntions and 
iliscovcrics which liarc illustrated thc lntcr ages of the ~~or l c l ,  linrc 
cnnscd that a loftier ideal of moral and intcllcctual csccllcncc is 
presented to us than could hnvc been apprehended by the iviscst 
phiiosophcr of past times. Nevertheless, betrccn thc cicilizatioii 
of the grcat Assyrian Empirc or that of Egypt, and the barbarism 
which existed morc or less without their pale, the distance \\-as ~ c r s  
considcnblc. We have only to remember that the progenitors of tho 
Hindoos of today  wcrc pcrhaps thc instructors of all thc nations of 
antiquity j and the carliest cultivators of scicncc-that in the days of 
Assyrian glory mcn werc subject to just lam-held the virtues in 
cstcem, and used refined arts, for us to perccivc that c ~ e n  then tliero 
must hare hccn sent  ineqditics. All history, indccd, is a record O F  
contrasts and inequalities manifcsted in crcr mrj-ing degrcc by nations 
and by individuals. 
As inequality, then, is thc law of man’s condition, so does i t  follow 
that thcrcfrom should arise competition; and as man being n. crcature 
of manifold instincts, is compclled for the support of his body, thc 
derclopment of his mind, and thc gratification of his passions, to find 
n field for their cxcrcisc, so is ho brought a t  once face to face to strire 
with others for the mastery. Self-interest, ~ & i c h  is hcrc thc instinct 
of self-prescrration, compels a man to put forth his best porcrs; and 
there we strike a t  once the key-note of our subject. A’ecmity makcs 
incn competc ; and competition leads to contcntion, and contcntion to  
the predominance of one. And d i e r e  most is to be gaincd, there will 
gntlicr naturally thc more competitors, and there will bccur tlic fiercest 
struggle. Taking mankind, then, as a whole, a11 arc inore or less 
induced to competc for supcriority on some particular Geld, by tlic 
constitution of a nature which takes pleasure in gain, and farm, and 
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YIRTUTE ET VALORE. 493 
applause ; and all arc morc or less compcllcd to competition in order to 
csistcncc. 
Hcncc, that which most powcrfully urges to strire for prc- 
cmincnee is thc ncccssity ivhich exists for coinpetition ; alld tlicrefore, 
the necessity for striring to be superior in such competition. 
Now thc question put to US and stanriing n t  tho head of this papc~; 
is not to bc nnsvcrcd by onlj- furnishing abstract theol*ies. \VC tntc- 
it mtlicr that thc a n s ~ ~ c r  should be the asking onrselrcs .cr-hat pmctical 
lessons ~ T C ,  as Englishmen, may dcrivc from thc study in historJ- of 
v h a t  brought about the iisc to power of certain peoplcs ; a11cI I\-C can- 
not apply thosc lessons without inclircctly considering the causes: of 
their fall from pomr. 
Wc do not propose, then, to plunge into speculntions as to \rlletllcy 
or not, or how, nations hnvc prodcnt ia l  iiiisTions in  the -,~orld; 
whether it will be thc samc with thc nations of to-clnr, as 11-ith tllosc 
of antiquity wliich rose, dominntccl, and passed away ; but 11-e sllall 
liopc to fiud, not far from thc surfncc of thc subject, suflicicnt to teach 
u s  in a very plain and pmctical mannc~, the lessons d l i e h  thc life and 
death of other crnpircs conr-cj-. For it is ivcll that those ~ 1 1 0  prcsnme 
on the possession and continuancc of prc-cmincnce, should rcalizc that 
thc history of pcoples as IIarcly, ns b r a ~ c ,  as cntcrprising as nnj- now 
in cxistcncc, shon-s that suprcmnc~-, so far from Irrcing prorictcntial niid 
assured, proms only SO to be,  lien the necrssnry qualitics for i ts  
rctcntion arc put in cxcrcise. 
When Blaric and Attila triumphcd over the decaying rcmu:iiits of 
thc virtuc and hcroism of Rome, what ni-ailed it to recal that in days 
of glory 'gone by, crcn tho great C:irtliaginian liad failed bcforc iht: 
intrcpicl ~ I T ~ J -  of Scipio ; and that tlm phalanx of JIaccdoii had bocii 
shattered in thc shock of tLc trained legions of AIctellns ? 
To return : inequalit,y bcing thc lnu- of man's condition, strifc.iuid 
contentiou tlicrc must al~yaj-s be. 1':vcn if  thc ~ ~ - o r l d  ~ e r c  pzoplcd 
cntircly by mcn of onc incc and one tongue, tlic condition undcr which 
the  cry esistcncc of man is alonc possible, .-&., by his labour and by 
his bartering the p r o ( h x  of his labour, would be fatal to the rcalizn- 
tion of any dream of pcrpctunl concord. And if such is the case, tlieii 
the divisions of thc human race into groups TarXing in phj-sical aspect 
and capncitics, in  nicntal cndowmcnts, in tongue, crced, and manners ; 
and the sub-divisions of these again, through thc migrations of 
waiidcring nations and through dispcrsion by conquest, hnrc natumllj- 
tended to complicatc international rclations. Tliosc causes d i ich  hart, 
conduccd to sepamtc cach group and malic it morc distinct from i[s 
ncighbour, and to stamp an individuality upon it, ham contributed to 
makc thc struggle for prc-cinincncc, nlrcadj- n, necessitj-, a matter of 
patriotic duty. Of thcsc causes n potent one has been thc geographical 
position occupied by certain peoples a t  diffcrcnt times, which has giwn 
tlicm points of nntagc towards which the inxlth and commcrcC of the 
world h a w  bccn attracted, and which ham thereby bccomc centres of 
p o ~ c r  and influence. Again, the topographical peculiarities of n 
country, such a5 its inaccessibility from without, thc dcfcnsiblc nature 
of its militarx positions, tlic productiwmcss of its soil 01' its mineral 
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494 VIRTUTE ET T'I~LORE. 
7.1-calth ; these and other like causcs haye n rery strong tendency to 
invest n peoplo with marked idiospcracics. 1Ve need only cite thc 
instance of ancient Grcccc cut up by the topographical peculiarities of 
the country into n number of little states, haring each their own mode 
of go\-ernment, and strong1~- marked national or rather tribal charac- 
teristics. 
I f  n-c turn to our maps and follow them in the order of history, wc 
find the grcatest difference to exist bctwxn the physical conformatioll 
.of the great contincnts, and the course of human events to hare bcni 
closely directed by the peculiarities of such conformation. 
Over and above the jealoitsies and ambitions which haw prompted 
rulers to embark on enterprises of conquest and plunder ; orer and 
keyoud the aversions subsisting bctmxn ncighbouring peoples differing 
i n  tongue and creed, it has been tho gcograpliical opportnnit_c for 
quarrel that has hail n great part in determining the direction of grcrrt 
The historx of thc human race begins in Asia. Tho cradle of 
mankind was also its earlicst battle-ground and its first burjing-place. 
Nontesquiou obscrres, The n-ell-watered plains which intersect the 
Asiatic Continent lying side by side with the rast steppes that must 
-" for erer form the home of pastoral nations, the former ham becomc 
" tho abodes of commercial opulence, and this is the true reason of thc 
." violent revolutions not merely of dynasty but of cmpiro which in 
" every age hare distinguished the history of that p e a t  portion of thc 
" globe." From time to time the nomad tribes of the descrt, accus- 
tomed to a life of wandering over rast pastoral districts, from the 
confines of China, rrith their flocks and herds, have, under tho impulse 
of some inspired lendcr, in-iadcd the richer liaunts of the cl\i-ellcrs by 
the plains, and subdued and ejected the wore effeminate and corrupted 
inliabitants of the cities. 
" Europe a d  America," says Sir Archibald Alison, " h i - c  an 
" entirely cliffcrent physical conformation. KO arid deserts there 
" retain the chilhcn of Japhet, in every successivc generation, in the 
- U  rude habits, and mingled virtues and vices of tlicir fathcrs; no 
. " tnblc-lands or boundless steppes bring the warriors of the descrt 
*'' into close proximity with the cities of the plain, or the riches and 
" rices of civilization. Tho riches of cirilization need no longer fcar 
(' the rapine of the dcscrt; the contests of nations lead only to 
" mutual improvement in the militarj- art, and n more dccidcd 
t' supcriority orcr the other families of mankind. Tlic lorel fncc of 
4' the greater part of the country renders it snsccptiblc of the labonr 
" of agriculture; mineral riches a t  owe inyitc and rc\v-ard tlie toils of 
*' the nrtizan; tlio dccp indentations of tlic const, and numerous 
" inland seas, le t  in, to tho rery heart of tlie contincnts, the wealth 
*' and interests of commerce." 
States are, as Q-C raid just now, sometimes thrust by their 
geographical position into situations of greater pro~inencc than 
.others a t  particular periods of Ljstorj-. I n  former -ages, one great 
empire at n time absorbed the interest of the world ; then later on, 
:*me small state by the exhibition of energy, iyould push itself into 
a1-ars. 
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VIRTUTE ET VALORE. 495 
prominence, and bccomc in its turn a great polyer. But farther on, 
subsequent to the b m k  up and dispersion of the ccntnl pomr  at 
Rome, states bcgan to cstablisli thcmsclves \I-ithin better defiiied 
boundaries ; power bccamc more distributed ; no rnst central authority 
dominated crery other; and on the decentralized masses arose s l o d y  
pomrful nations bent on preserving their own independence and self- 
govcrnni cnt . 
Tliere is this essential clifferenee then, betmen the Situation of the 
great cmpircs, before and including Rome, and that of the great 
European statcs which ham grown out of the ruins of Rome. 
Absolute supremacy orcr every known people within reach, Ivas the 
condition of nncknt tenure of dominion. Whereas the. general 
tendency in later times lias been, except with certain intervals, when 
onc or other has for a timc absolutclr predominated, to favour tho 
formation of states strong enough to exercise inflncnce, but not to 
command it. In  other words, the European nntions more and more 
liavc realized thc advantage of n “ balance of pols-cr ” bcing maintained 
among thcm. 
7Vc havc nos- endeavoured to state briefly the conditions under which 
nations find themsclws placed, as regards their mutual relations. We 
l i a n  seen that in greater or lcss degree, from many Farious causes, 
some of theni not under mnn’s control, contqntion becomes a 
necessity; and that contention must lead to the prc-eminence of onc. 
Let us now apply ourselves to the question, why do some particular 
peoples achicro pre-cmincncc, while others never appear in thc fore- 
ground of victory ? 
Why do some maintain a constant prc-cminencc ? Why are others 
as  it were, only by flashes, supreme ? 
TVC ivould lay down broadly, that nations attaiu pre-cminencc 
through the posscssion of ccrtain innatc qualities, moral, physical, nud 
intellectual, which havc guided thcm in the formation of tlicir 
institutions, civil and mili tq-,  and by the cultiration of which 
these institutions hare been matured and maintaincd. 
d n d  particularizing, we should say prc-eminence is attained by n 
mtion on account of:- 
1st. Innate vigour of mcc. 
2nd. Stability of its institutions. 
3rd. IIoral nnd intellectual advaiiccmcnt. 
4th. Industrious dcrelopmcnt of its rcsourccs. 
First of all “blood d l  tcll.” There is uo disputing that. 
Xcithcr on the other hand, can it be said that blood is cmytliiiig; 
for races sprung from thc same stock having diridcd in thc course 
of history, show a subsequent marked dirergcncc of characteristics, 
through the different influences to which, in the course of years, tliey 
arc subjected. We need not stay to notice a most remarliablc instancc 
of the truth of this in the case of the Cimri (the Khmcrioi of 
Hcrodotus) who conquered Britain ; and after inundating Gaul, 
Italy, and Greece, spread thcnisclrcs oversAsia. They settled under 
precisely similar p71ysicaZ conditions, being children of the same blood, 
in Europe and in Asia j mhilc they garc birth to nations, Europcnii 
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49 ti \'IRTUTE ET VALORC. 
and Asiatic, diamctrically the opposite to each other in all tho 
characteristics of humanity. But going back to the beginning of 
authentic history, wc find mccs exhibiting even then markcd 
diffcrences, somc posscssing a \-@our and vitality J-rhich, as in tho 
casc of thc Europcan Cimri, inoculated their descendants morc 01. 
less to adistant posterity: and others spin arc feeble from the first, 
and sccmcd destined and on$- fitted, likc many African pcoplc, to 
occupy the lo~wi -  ground. It is impossiblc to s~~pposc,  inorc'owr, 
that thc same races, so far are thcj- brlow the arerage of mankind in 
both moral and mental apprehension, can, by any lapse of time or 
cxpcrience of cirilizing iiitluences 31-liatcrcr, be so improrecl as to bu 
able to compctc foi. prc-eminence in any of thc manlicr forms of 
liiimau nmbition, wit11 the immcmoriallj- more rigorous peoples, 
EO long as these turn to account their natuid gifts. So long oiily, 
for fen- things arc morc persistently ignorcd or lost sight of, 
than the fact that supcrioritj- in an indi~iilnal or in D nation can 
newr bc soIc1~- the offspriiig of inborn rirtucs, but can only be 
maintaincd a t  thc cspcnsc of forethought niid practical cffort. And, 
ivliilc alluding to this, IT-C x-ould obscrrc how very hastg wxc  somc 
of the conclusions arriwrl at bj- critics on thc cvcnts of tlic great 
~ : i r  of 187041. When confounded by thc perpetual and complete 
dcfeots sustained by tlic French, criticism assumed that tlic Latin 
race it-as xorn  out, that the German was being f a r  and n ~ a y  
superior to liis adwrsarj-, anil that France iroulcl never risc agyin 
to become D worthy rival! How often was that jud,gmcnt passed! 
Yet d i c n  we comc to consider all thc circunistances dispasionatdy, 
IVC shall probably think to be n e a r c ~  the truth when wc say that tlic onc 
nation had, by the exercise of forethought and patient pixctieal effort, 
attained to a verj- high d e g c c  of cscellcnce in its ability to dewlop 
and ntilizc its strcngtli : u-hercas t h  other, t h o u g h  earclessncss 
nncl ignorance, tlu-ongli the -\miit of exercising a \rise and reasonnblc. 
forctliought, 1iad fallen rcrj- short of its ordinary liigli standard. 
J\-c shall endeavour prcscntly to give tho slightest possiblc skctcli 
of the history of, certain grcat empires ; just so mucli of each as siiall 
show us how it canic to 1x155 tha t  thcy fell from thcir supremacy. NC 
shall find tliat it \\-as not bccausc thcir prc-cmincncc liad bccn won 
through n conibination of fortuitous circumstances, and was tliercforc 
liable to be lost by ndvcrsc fortunc; not bccausc their dolpinion had 
been acqnircd.through tbc gcniiis of one or two grcnt men, anil that 
grcnt men were not fortlicomirig at a dangcrous crisis, but simply 
1)ecausc tiicy no -longer cshibitcd the qualities rnhicl~ hail before 
securcd them sncccss. TYe should doubtless bc wrong in supposing 
that all nations d ~ i c h  a t  various times haw ncquircd ascendency by 
force of arms over all competitors in tlicir day, u-ould have held thcir 
ground cqiially well against others, irho a t  n different epoch were 
suprcmc in their dny. It were idlc to speculate, for instance, whcthci. 
the Spartan a t  his best, or the Briton a t  his best, the Roman or  tho 
Cerninn wcrc the better man ; but this may be affirmed, that, as with 
indiriclnals so n-ith nations, somc.chnnctcrs and dispositions arc not 
cnpablc of enduring the nmoiint of disciplinary training nccessaq to 
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gii-c them supremacy in a scvcrc contest. Yet may the)- bc ucry fine 
characters too-capable of grcat things, possibly thc greatest in sonic 
departments of human activity; but not ~ ) O S S C S S C ~  of the stamina to 
prcvail over mucli mhen tested by thc stern ordeal of mar. Hence 
lyhat rcproach to thosc peoples, who gifted Kith qualities which put to 
:Iccount ~vould cnsurc them succcss, (70 they allom tliemscl\-cs to fall 
1)clom thc inark ! 
Assurcclly it is no slight aclrantagc to a pcop!~ to c o w  of a p o d  
stock. Xany alcader \r-holiad he led to battle thc troops of his anta- 
gonist would hare conquered, and haw been set don-n as a general of 
mark, Iias fallcn out of history, because the fibre of his men was not, 
equal to that of the enemy; many a beautiful and @lmt army, fullof 
fire and dcrotion, thc 1-cry pick of what its nation could producc, 
representing that nation in its highest esprcssion of warlike aptitude, 
113s failed for no other reason than that -worked up to its bcst, it  yet 
could not compass thc more solid qualities of its antagoaist. 
Xovihere was this morc clearly shown than in the fact that tlic 
French, about in ordinary coursc equal figliters with Russians, 
Austrians, or Prussians, could by 1-irtue of the genius of Xapoleon, bc 
ilnprorcd to that pitch, that nnder his guidancc for years together 
they became far more than n match for either of thciu ; and yct D o t  
crcn that consummate soldier could communicate to liis bcst troops tlit. 
qualities which it was csscntial they sh0111d possess in order to be ablc 
to mnquish British armies on an equal ficld. Tlic higlicst esprcssion 
of tlic capacity of thc nation for  x a r  w\-ns found in thc armies of 
Xapoleon; but not even his teaching could cnablc them to 1-el-crsc 
that judgment of histoiy to TI-hich the witnesses Crccy andilgincourt, 
I3lcdeim and ;\Ialplaquet, had long before siibscribcd ; and whicli 
Salamancn, Tittoria, and Waterloo wxc  destined to cndorsc, viz., thc 
superior battle-qualities of the British Soldier. " Thc British soldier, 
"3-s &pier, "is the soldier of battle." 
Let us now look at what me havc termed another causc of prc- 
cmincncc, ~-iz., stability of institutions. And hcrc wc would remark 
that d i c n  wc speak of pre-eminence in war, me do not  inclndc within 
that term the temporaq succcss which an occasional outburst OE 
enthusiasm in almost any nation may enable it to secure. It may 
shon- us, indeed, that the nation is not incapablc of being \nought up 
to n ccrtain pitch undcr exceptional auspiccs ; but truc greatness is 
shown by the cxhibition of superior qualities undcr ad\-crsc-as i d 1  as  
under favourable circumstances. A commanding gcnins may open tlic 
may to  fame, and while he lins, may do much cFen with unpra- 
missing material ; but unless there is prcsent, in ~ r h a t  wc hsvc called 
thc moral fibre of a people, thc capacitF for sustained energy, tlic 
achievement of permanent prc-cmincncc is out of the question. h c l  
thc real test of grcatiicss is thc duration of the rcsults oE its action. 
Stability in thc institutions of a nation contributes dircctly to i t s  
success in war, inasmuch as stability is thc offspring of order, and of 
well-clefived authority, and just Ian-s, and ~11erc  such exist, thc army, 
which is rcprcsentativc of the nation, will ccrtaidy bc the dcpositayy 
of iliscipliiic and obcdiencc. A lost battlc under such conditions will 
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frcqucntly bc no more than n lost battle; thc foundations arc not 
shakcn, though some of the outTorl-s may be shattered. It  as rcry 
true and sharp what Francis of Austria said to Rapolcon aftcr tho 
ruin of Ulm and Austerlitz. “Had this happened to you, SOU coulil 
not return to your capital, whereas I may rcturn to mine in con. 
“fidence.” In  thc one casc, the institutions of the empirc had for long 
been contentedly acceptcd by a lop1  and patriotic peoplc ; in the othcr 
no govcrnment existed but what ims supported on the point of a 
successful sirord. As no army is worthy the name of such, which is not 
held together under strict conditions of organization and discipline, 
SO must an army directly suf€cr, and the bonds of order be dangerously 
relased, when thc government is of uncertain authoritJ-, and liablc to 
sudden and unmeasured cliangcs. 
And this point is clowly conncctcdwith thc next, -i-iz.,whatharo moral 
and intellectual progress got to do with attainmcnt of pre-emincnce ? 
We would answer, much or little, according to circumstances. We 
cannot, for instance, attribute the triumph of barbarian hordes 
a t  various epochs of the world’s history, to any othcr causes than tho 
blind impetus of reckless -i-alonr sweeping beforc it the already 
dissolving dements of a corrupt ci~lization. And the great con- 
querors we read about, hare rery seldom been distinguishcd by thc 
morality of the means thcy used, hon-cvcr considerable the intellectud 
‘culture of their people or the brilliance of their indiridual genius. 
But in the long run, the history of all nations shows that therc is an 
inscparable conncction between the m o d s  of a people and their 
national prosperity. If we look at the earlier times of Rome, 
thc life of the people i-ms characterized by a virtuous and rigid sereiity 
of conduct; by tcmperancc, frugality, and probity. Only by intellcctual 
cnltiration, could Romans rise to the high offices and dignities of state. 
A virtuous simplicity of manners, the training of all the yonth to the 
use of arms and t u  athletic cscreiscs, and a rigour of military 
discipline, paved the way for thc triumph of thc Roman arms, ancl 
secured them thcir prodigious conquests. To come to modern 
times, there can be no question but tlie moral and intellectual 
progrcss of a people arc the surest guarantees for the prescrration of 
its liberties and indcpendcncc; and TTC shall see when we come 
later on to consider the wars n-hich hare been waged nearcr our 
own times, liom largo n part the education of a nation has to say 
not only to its political but also to its military success. And under the 
hcacl of‘ moral progress, wc have a vast advantage over the peoplcn 
of antiquity in that Christianity has givcn us something rcal and 
tangible on which to build our moralitj-; and d d c  the early 
and austcrc manners of Rome tcnclcd to educate the peoplc in  the 
stoical school of philosophy, and the later and corrupt to allure 
towards thc morc genial doctrincs of Epicurus, modern life is giveu 
a rerelation on mhich momls may be formed, and by which they can, 
through exertion in the path of duty, bo improved and maintained. 
B u t  there is this in common to thc ancient and to tho modern worId, 
that  patriotism;virtue, and coumgc are ercr t h o m y  to national honour. 
Tke truth is, tho moral spirit of cvery peoplc is thc mainspring of its 
L C  
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action, its energizing principle, and the only ultimate foiindation 
If wc turn over the pages of ancient and 
nlodern times, find that it influences men, inspiring .them with 
nrdour and confidencc, or damping their faith in their cause and in 
themselves, rrhcthcr they are armed with bows and arrolvs, or l\-ith 
the scientific weapons of to-day. Nora1 qualities arc the possession of 
no particular age or pcoph csclusirclp, though their cultivation 
is the result of their 0 ~ x 1  action or ncglect. 
TVC will no\\- notice, but bricfi~-, as we shall hayo to return to the 
point latcr on, that part of OUP subject haying reference to  tile 
mili tag institutions of states, their warlike spirit, and ?nor& of 
tlicir armies, matters necessarily of supreme importance in connection 
&h. the qucstion, “ how nations attain prc-eminence in mar.” 
4 4  Onc of the most csscntialpoints of thc militarypolicyof a state,” 
‘6 TVc find 
nearly the s6mc principles have presidcd a t  the formation of militarj- 
institutions among ci-dizcd people of a11 times who hare bccn 
succcssful in mu.. \\’c creu  find ,Z definite recruiting system TThcrcby 
armies are rcgularlF replenished SO far back as the clays of the 
Assyrian cnipirc. We knoiy that the organization of the component 
parts of hcr forces was mostmrcfully \r-orked out in the conquering 
days of Rome. I n  Spatta, the ~ h o l c  youth  as trained to the use 
of arms, and to go through every exercise which soldiers would 
h a w  to practise in I-rarfare. Certain essential conditions go to the 
making of any army worthy of the name; such as the regular system 
of recruiting ; a definitc organization ; a due snppIy of rcserrcs ; 
intelligent instrytion of officers and men in their m i l i t q  duties and 
exercises; a strict but not humiliating disciphe; a fair. sp tem of 
rewards; perfecting of armament, 6-c. TVc shnll see as x e  proceed, 
h0.n- bound up with the succcss they obtained, was the attention and 
intclligcncc giwn to these matters by the conquering powers of 
former days; and wc shall recognize that eren more than this is 
necessary in modcrn Tarfare, when the development of the ar t  is eyer 
producing some fresh problem for solution. 
But the adoption by a gorcrnment of tho best regulations for thc 
organization of an army rrould be n i n  if it did not a t  the same time 
keep d i r e  and cultirate a military spirit in its citizens. It TTRS to the 
union of civic rirtucs and military spirit fostcrccl by their institutions, 
that the Roninns iwrc indebted for  their grandeur. And though it is 
trnc that industry, commcrcial aptitude, and the labour of the soil 
are the direct contributors to the prosperity of 3 nation, yet is i t  
impossiblc that prosperity shall be permanent, unless the manly and 
heroic x-irtucs find the Erst place in the institutions of a gorcrnment, 
and in the hearts of the p ~ ~ p l e .  noble law, which in the 
early clays of Rome, required D prerious military service of ten ycars 
in any aspirant for public employ. It was deemcd necessary that the 
military spirit should be encouraged among the peoplc, hy investing 
the army n-ith public consideration, and making its efficiency manifest 
and its discipline and obedience conspicuous for example, and it xas 
equally rcquisito that the same spirit should bo enmuraged in tho 
national greatness. 
Jomini, “ is the nature of its military institutions.” 
That was 
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say patriotic, spirit in fhosc who scrve, means besides compctin-g for 
rcjrard, thc simplc faithful attention to duties in  thc pnblic serrice a5 
being duties-thc conriction that constancy in ndrcrsc circumstances, 
is Set morc rtdmirablc than cvea n noble cnthusiasm or Talorous 
ciitcrprizc in advancing o n  dnngcr, and such, a spirit in thosc who 
gorcrn, is intcrprcted by thc honouring and promoting legitimate 
merit ; stimulating to honourxblc cornpctition in intellectual and 
phj-sicd cserciscs j clisgi*ac+q all that is mean and corardly ; and 
promoting tlic cmsc of tcmpcrancc, truth, and order. 
TVc will cnclcavonr now to cshibit, as succinctly as possible, a sketch 
of tlic Iiistory of two or thrcc cmpircs d h h  rosc to pre-cmincncc in 
the u-orld of antiquity-giring 3 mcrc ontline SO far as to enable us 
to unclcrstand \;-hat canscs contributed to thcir risc to po\\-er, and 
wInt  operated to their rlcclinc and cstinction. For it viould bc 
quite bcsidc thc marl: did TVC only inquire what conquests wcrc mxlc 
by which peoples, what was tho number of their armics and their 
or3inization, ~ r l i o  31-crc their p a t  leaders, ancl Tr-hat they did. KO 
inquiry ~ ~ - o u l d  be complctc if wc did not knoll- something of the 
institutions, nianncrs, progress in thc arts, and statc of cirilizntion 
gcnerallg-. Thcrc ham cristcd peoples, distinguished by thc 31-isclom 
of thcir gorcrnmcnt, tliz justice of their ~ ~ T T S ,  tlic sociability of their 
Innnuers, and dcrotion to tlic arts and sciences, v h o  Iiarc never 
occnpicd a high placc as fi xarlikc and conquering racc; yet speaking 
gcnc~l ly ,  it  ~vould sccm to bc incontcstablc that, wIicrc n cirilizntion 
is still hardy, aud morals ancl manners arc not as yet dcbascd and 
corrupted, aptituclc for war \ i l l  bc found on the sidc of intclligencc 
and prosperit.;, and n loyal pntriotism i d 1  bc discovered wherc thcrc 
csist institutions and libcrties worthy to bc defcnded. 
From thc carliest tirncs of authentic history, v-c find tlie necessity 
:~eknoirledgccl for thc cxistencc of armies, and thc desirability of 
siring tlicrn consistency, and making thcm amcnablc to order bj- some 
kind of organization. Organization tool; almost neccssarily the simplc 
form of rlistribution of bodies of men, according to thc WLF tliey wcrc 
nrmed, in certain rlcfinitc numbcrs, linring rcsponsiblc chiefs, witli 
otlicw of highcr I ~ l l l i  to col1trol t h  1rh01~. ’\Ye know from thc 
sacred writings, tliat thc Jcwish armies liad thcir regularly constituted 
units of commniid, and that thc troops verc cscrcisccl in arms and 
manmiiT-re. But thc period of thc d s c  of thc Hcbren- monarclig- 
spchronises with that of the decline of n mighty cmpiic. What wc 
may almost call thc “in~ent ion ” of deciphering languagcs x-rittcn in 
unknown characters, has brought lately to our Iiznorledgc much that 
had not accnratcly been nsccrtained before, concerning thc history of 
AsSyria. It is instructkc to consider of this vast cmpirc, giren to thi: 
intelligent pinsuit of all thc arts of peace, while formidable to fay and 
near through thc proficiency of its nrmics ; 2nd that cmpirc disappear- 
ing after avddc, and so utterly, tliat its rcry alphabet has to 110 
rccoincd ! 
7Vc h o n -  for certain that in thc days of its snprcmacj-, a high state 
of cirilizntion rcipcd in thc cmpirc of “ that p a t  king, the king of 
Wc takc it that thc cultivation of n militarj-, or shall 
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6 6  Asspia.” Thc monarchs ~ w r e  absolute sovcrcigiis who lind thc 
clepartmcnts of stnte duly officercd, and tlic provinccs rcgnlarly 
:,C1ministcrcd. Thc pcoplc practisccl trades in high pcrfcction ; tlicrc 
,\-Cr~ mnnufacturcs of iron, copper, and 11ronzc. They had written 
tables of lam- j paid rcgnlar taxes ; and used to hold something nearly 
our ccnsus, and which gave n gcncral account of tlic 
pop&tion of thc empire, a list of the products of thc ~ a r i o n s  districts, 
3ud ZL list of Iandon-ncrs with thcir propcrty. Tlicrc n-ere writers on 
rlatnral history and astronomy ; they Trerc m w d  in mathematics 
n l l c l  arithmetic, inclncting scparc nnd cubc root j the7 had grammars 
:InLi lexicons, wliich madc tllc Chddcan and Cnb>-lonian tongnes 
intelligible to thcm. Tlieir kings erected magnificent public edifices ; 
bnilt bridgcs j constructed canals j and excnratcil tunnels. 
to thc geographical opportunities enjoyed by 
fiomc peoples, applies here. Asspis occupicd thc centre of ;I r n s t  
cspanso of rich fiat soil capable of snpporfing an enormous popdntion. 
XO mountain chains nor foruiiclablc st:-cams scpniatcd o m  part of the 
c0untr-j from anothcr. Tlic power and iiiafSuificcncc of tho kings 
oreran-cd tlic p~ople ~ h o  l i d  no mcans or thouglit of resisting the 
royal will. The bronc1 flat plains gave thc surrounding raccs, brokcn 
lip into small nations, littlc chancc of rcsistnncc n-llcn onec thc central 
1)oxvcr Iiad n will to cspnnd nucl acquirc frcsli tcrritory. WIicn tlic 
&nninion of Asspin Lad been asscrtcd orcr the, aucl thc kingdom 
tonchcd thc bordcrs of otlicr great and rising poi~crs, more serious con- 
flicts awaited it. Bnt thc Assyrians, irhilc cultivating arts and letters 
find engaging in trades, had not neglcctcd thcir military institutions. 
They had a rcgular army which ~ v a s  composed of contingents that cnch 
prorincial Gorernmcnt had annually to  furnish, numbering usuallr 
fibout 4,000 men. These contingents vere marchcd cithcr to asscmblc 
at the capital, or at CL gircn point of dcparturc if any cspedition were 
intended. Thcy not only 11ad armies regularly constituted, r d h  
officcrs of Yarious gradcs h o k h g  larger and lesser commands, but 
thcj- recopiscd that n-ar is an ar t  requiring to be leai-ncd like other 
arts. Wc hare not, unfortu11atcly, many rcliatlc data on n-hicli to 
construct n theory of thcir method of maliing n-ar in detail; but 11-c 
1;non- thcy could rxicmporisc military bridges ; thnt on onc occasion, 
a t  lcast, thej- passed tlic Thole of thcir army OTCP tho E:uphi*atcs on 
inflated skins j and that they n-erc in the habit of making long night- 
marches vith a Tic\\- to fall nnexpcctcdly on thcir enemy at  daiyn. 
Then they ~ a g e r l  succcssfd viar, not only against barbarian tribes 
)jut with considcrablc p o ~ c r s ,  such as Armenia and Elam, Egj-pt and 
Syria. Later on, when tho abuses of unrestrained dcspotism paved 
thc way, through tlic crcation of ci\*il disscnsions, for  flie declinc of 
their porrcr, and continued SUCCESS had blunted the edge of their 
inilituy appetitc, thc’ Assyrians succumbed to those very states x-hieli 
beforc they had rictorioizsly encountered, and tho t-j-pogmphical 
facilities for conquest, of whiich they had made such good use, were 
now turncd agrninst thcm into an casy occasion for their ruin. 
It is interesting to obserre, at this early stngc of tho n-orld’s history, 
cirilization and military pron-css going Land in hand ; and instructirc 
What we said bcforc 
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to note that thc contests of a great people with formidable cncmics, 
serve, so long as they are true t o  themselves, to call forth their best 
cncrgics; but when oncc thc sech of intcinal corruption and dis- 
scnsion begin to bear their lcgitimatc fruit, it requires but a slight 
shock from without, and the mholc fabricof power crumbles into ruin. 
TQo will nest briefly noticc thc monarchy of Persia, which o&s 
inany points of resemblancc with that of Assyria, but whosc history is 
morc interesting, inasmuch as it was brought into frequent collision 
with thc states of Grcecc ; and thcrcby wc obtain vivid illustrations 
of the comparative capacity for mar of tho Asiatic and the European. 
Persia, from b-ing o small province, was nnitcd by Cyrus Kith the 
independent tribcs of Ncclio under one sccptrc; and that monarch 
fonndcd a vast Persian dominion on thc ruins of thosc of Lyclia, 
Egypt, and Babylon, v-hom hc successively snbdued. The nem 
cmpirc eshibited, as had AsSyria, before it, Iiigh degrec of civili- 
zation. Under thc king, mhosc authority was, nfi among all Asiatic 
peoplcs, absolute, were satraps or governors of pronnces, each of 
whom ~ r a s  madc personally accountable for the conduct of every 
detail of his government to  the sowreign. It was the officc of the 
latter to risit each provincc periodically to asccrtain for himsclf holr. 
the statc macliine was working. He came to see that the laws were 
administered justly ; that abuses mere eorrectcd, and to give ax1 
impulse to trade, thc study of the arts, and the practice of agriculture. 
Thc state possessed a religion in which arc to bc found many sublime 
truths and excellent principlcs of morality. Parents xrcrc constrained 
to give the utmost attention to  thc training of their children; the 
state, moreorcr, providing for their moral education. The entire 
J-outh of the country 11-crc trained to the use of arms s~-stcmaticalIy. 
and to athletic exercises. The people were distinguished by thcir 
temperance and thc rirtuous simplicity of thcir manners. 
I n  such a state as this was it probnble the armed forcc 7rould be 
bchind its brethren in ciril life ? History tells us, on the contrq-, 
that thc early Persians wcrc rcnoirncd for their intrcpidity in iyar. 
IVIicn, later on, occurred their great contcsts 3rith the Grceks, 
they had grown corrupted and effeminate from thc acquisition of rast 
wealth and the general prevalence of luxury. Even then, they 7verc 
oftcn morc than n match for any but the best among thc Greeks, such 
as the Spartans or thc Athenians. We read that not long beforc 
JIarathon, " thc Greeks of Ionin had nercr seen such o terrible enemy 
s L  as thc Persians who nom- attacked them. In the Lydian wars they 
" had seen a finc caralry, but the Persians had new troops and COIL 
'L trivanccs of ereq- kind. Thcir archers shot the defenders of the 
L L  ~valls. They brought up machines for regular sieges; they sur- 
1' ro11ncled thc t o i ~ n s  with trenches ; they built up mounds against the 
6 :  ~ : ~ 1 1 e ,  or threw thc vdls down by undermining them." It is triic 
thcsc xi-ere only Ionian GrCCIiS, andwe find that when the Asiatic came 
into contact with thc Enropc:~n propcr, tho latter as &in1 premiled. 
We should obserre, howcrer, that when the Pcrsians and Greeks met, 
thc character of the former had already undcrgonc o great chanqc. 
Th. ~eak i i c s s  or indolence of tlic central pan-er had allomcd of: h c 
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eatmps taking more and more into their own hand, and luxury and 
effeminacy following on the acquisitiou of vast wealth, a general 
deterioration of manners and character ensued. 
I11 fitted mere her armies then to meet the Athenians, just then proud 
of their new liberties, and the Spartans, a nation of warriors ! I n  vain 
did the Persians bring numbers into the field to supply the place of 
d o u r  j they were for all their multitudes no cqual match for heroism 
guided by military skill. And wt! may notice in passing that when 
courage is wanting to an army, military skill is generally absent also : 
for where courage is not, the sense of duty and honour must liavo 
departed, and the exercise and study of the profession of arms ha&g 
h e n  neglected, even had a leader great talents, yet would he look in 
vain for intelligent support among his subordinates. 
Persia, after her defeats in Greece, still remained a great Asiatic 
power, and finding she could keep the Grceks dis-united by her gold 
more easily than she could conquer them by her arms, she succeeded 
in setting Greek against Greek for a long series of years, until the 
llacedonxm Alexander brought them together to ruin her. 
The Greeks saved Europe from being conquered and overrun by 
Asiatics. No race ever did so many different thing so well as the Greeks. 
As poets, historians, philosophers, artists, soldiers, they were supremo. 
Greece produced some of the best commanders army ever followed, and 
the generalship of the chiefs was seconded by the intrepidity and 
endurance of the rank and file. 
Had Greece been a single state, or liad the sereraJ states invariably 
united against a common foe, Rome mould have found a terrible 
obstacle to her own preponderance, and, as Jomini says, " perhaps 
" Rome mould have failed before her." But admirably as Greece was 
situated geographically for maintaining the dominion of the seas, and 
for imposing her predominance on all sides, the topography of the 
country was exactly calculated to foster a spirit of independence and 
jealousy between the states, separated as they were by difficult ranges 
of mountains which everywhere intersect the peninsula. So KC find 
each little district setting up a government of its own, and bent on 
preserving its own autonomy. How vast is the effect of peculiarity of 
configuration of the natural features of a country, upon the ulterior 
life and ulterior destiny of a people ! We had just been speaking of 
tlie broad rich plains through which flow such rivers as Euphmtcs and 
Tigris, and where kings could be absolute and magnificent, and 
exercise a vast smay; and of Egjpt again watered by the Nile, which 
can be sailed up by the wind, and down which the current drops the 
traffic, and no obstacle to communication cxisting throughout the land ; 
from earliest times, Egypt mas a single country under an absolute ruler. 
But there is no one large flat tract in all Greece, so each district had 
its government, of whatever form. The consequence of so manj- 
separate autonomies  as division, and all through Grecian histoq- 
there mas the'same cause a t  mork ruining the power of Grecce, namelj-, 
the incapacity of the sereral states for acting together. It is not 
necessary to our purpose, and me should not have space to enter into n, 
riarmtive of how each pctty state grew to greater or less degree of 
YOL. XXI. 2 L  
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renown. It will suffice to take the instances of Sparta an? Athens, 
the two leading Grecian states, and afterwards of Xacedonm. Both 
Spartans and Athenians sent to battle, on occasion, armies as brave, 
with chiefs as able, as any of which history makes mention. Yet were 
their manners and characters essentially different. At Athens the arts 
mere in highest esteem ; the Laeedmnonians, on the other hand, 
despised the arts, with all who cultivated them. 
At  Athens the people aimed a t  refinement of manner, and sought 
enjoyment in a life of ease. 
Sparta, mas D hugh barrack, where luxury was unl;noivn, lvhcre 
frugality was the stern rule. Thc people were an army on duty. 
Thc principle of Lycurgus was, ‘‘ Luxury is the bane of Society,” and 
his institutions had no other end than to form D nation of soldiers. 
This tended to make the whole life of tho Spartans a preparation for 
war. At  the age of seven, boys mere taken from home and tnined by 
government officers to gymnastics and the use of arms, and to go 
through every exercise a soldier mould have to do in case of war. 
They learned to bear hardships without complaining ; were kept short 
of food to encouragc them to hunt; mere drilled every day; messed 
together; slept in barracks; and were not allowed to live with their 
wives and young children a t  home. 
No Spartan was allon-ed to trade ; they left agriculture to their 
helots; and so had nothing to do but hunt and practise the use of 
arms. One reason for this excessive devotion to the military pro- 
fession was the necessity they recognized of being always prcpared, not 
only to contest with Athens the leadership of Greece, but to prcserrc 
their rule among the helots, whom they had turned into slaves from 
being a frec people, when they conquered the country and established 
their kingdom. While the Spartan government mas acquiring 
solidity, Athens had been aprey to civil dissensions. Every description 
of form of government was t r i e d  in  vain, till danger from without 
united thp citizcns in upholding their common liberties against thc 
Thebans and Chalcidians, whom-thcy vanqnished in two brilliant r j c -  
tories. This occurring soon after the government of Athens had become 
a democracy from having been a tirnocmcy, the spirit of the citizens 
rose high ; they began to concern themselves more with the govern- 
ment of the state, and to take D patriotic interest therein. It was high 
time, for war with Persia ~ m s  soon to  come. 
The battle of Narathon, B.C. 460, was a singular instance of 
splendid courage. Barely ten thousand Athenian soldiers stood up to 
fight the hosts of Persia, which had not only conquered Babylon, but 
had scattered the armies of the Ionian Greeks. With rare sagacity 
thc Athenian Xiltiades had estimated accurately the power of Persian 
fighting, and juaged that Athenians would succeed where Ionians failed; 
and did not hesitate to stand up against a foe ten times more numerous. 
Then the army which no Greeks had ever resisted iyith succcss, went 
down that day before the intrepid soldiery of Athens. It was not 
long before the porer  and d o u r  of Greece vas put to a yet severer 
test when the stupendous host of Xerses poured down like a flood 
upon Attica. Then was it the turn also of LaccdEmon to show of 
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what quality mere her xvarriors; and the story of Thermopylm is a 
romance of real mar €or all time. Never in the long battle-roll of the 
&jtories of all countries, mas there a worthier episode than that corn- 
memorated on the monument set up there to the honour of Leonidas 
2nd his three hundred, " GO, ' stranger,' tell it at Lacedamon, that 
6' died here in obedience to  her laws." 
In  the succeeding battle of Platme, 300,000 Persians were totally 
defeated by the combined Spartan and Athenian armies. Thus the 
Persians who had conquered SO great an  empire, mere utterly beaten by 
a small part of Greece. Xuch is of course due to the bad leadership 
of the Persian commanders, and to the want of=charactcr in their 
troops. Nevertheless no people could display greater courage and 
resolution than did the Atlieninns throughout the Persian mar; and the 
Spartans were their worthy compeers. 
A t  this time the national character of the Greeks was a t  its highest 
elevation. Common danger had annihilated all petty jealousies for the 
time, and giren them as a nation union. 
But with the cessation of the danger, with the necessity apparently 
gone for that union which is strength, those jealousies returned, which 
were the precursors of ruin. 
During some years, hornever, the wisdom of a great statesman, 
Perieles, maintained Athens in the position of one of the two leading 
states of Greece. He devoted himself to the education and improve- 
ment of the people; he gave to them that lore of knowledge, poetry, 
and art, which remained to them when their military greatness had 
departed. And recognizing that after all, Athens, a great commercial 
power, depended more for its importance on preserving the dominion of 
the sen than on its being able to eontcnd on equal terms by laud with 
its rivals, he counselled that the city itself being secured by its forti- 
fications from attack, Athens should develope its marine rather than its 
land forces. 
Sparta presented a curious contrast ; while Perieles mas adorning 
Athens, Sparta remained still a rude town of barmcks. While 
the life of the Athenians mas full of variety and quickness, and 
enterprise had become part of their nature, their rivals kept to 
their rough military life; neglected education, and stdl thought of 
nothing but making themselres steady so1diei.s. Some twenty years 
after peace had bccn made with Persia, the great contest arose between 
democratic Athens and oliprchic Spnrta, called the Peloponnesian 
imr, which lasted tirenty-seven Fears, and is lmmortalized in the noble 
narrative of Thucydides. This long and desperate war ended in the 
ruin of Athens as a leading power. 
It was fought with great resolution and varying snccess, till the 
destruction of the gigantic and most ill-judged Athenian expedition to 
Sjracuse, which, had it bccn directed to the conquest of Sparta, could 
scarcely have failed to have terminated the war in favour of Athens, 
brought in its train the complete subjugation of that country to 
Lilcebmon. 
The introduction 
of wealth changed the character of the people; the simplicity of her 
2 L 2  
But success brought eventual ruin to Sparta also. 
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ancient manners g a w  way to ostentatious display of wealth, to 
contenipt and oppression of the poor. A n c l  as Athens seemed to have 
lost all her old ambition, and the pleasures of luxury were entirely 
supplanting the old heroic virtues ; and as her great men now \rere 
not soIdiers, or philosophers, or statsemen, but sculptors, comedians, 
or musicians, Greece mas in an abject situation when Philip of Nacedon 
conceired the project of bringing all the conntry under his dominion. 
It would be intercsting to notice briefly the wonclerful military 
exploit performed by a body of Greeks, shortly beforc Philip appeared 
on the scene, and known by the name of "the retreat of the ten 
" thousand." It has been excellently narrated quite lately by Najor  
Gcneral Vaughan, C.B., and is published in thc Journal of the 
Institution. 
The retreat may be briefly described as the march of a body of ten 
thousand men excellentlF drilled, armed and commanded, over a 
distmce of no less than eighteen hundred miles, during which they 
were exposed to a climate of great scvcrity; had to traverse broad 
rivers in the face of the enemy, were csposcd to the constant attack 
of hordes of cavalry in the plains, and were compelled to stay to fight 
with a succession of warlike and formidable tribes, occupj-ing difficult 
mountain districts. Yet after a march taking eight months to 
accomplish, the Greeks eventually reached the shores of the Black Sca, 
with dirninishcd numbers it is true, but in unbroken order, and with 
their discipline and military cfficiencj- unimpaired. Their tactics and 
readiness to adopt the most desirable formations argues, cspeeially 
w-lien wc consider the art of war had not received much development, 
great quickness of apprehension, as well as coolness in execution ; also 
iufinitc ability and resource on tlic part of thc leaders. We cannot 
sufficiently admire the way they adapted their tactics to circumstances, 
For instance, " when it was desired to make an imposing display of the 
troops, as on the ocwsiou of a review before the Cilician Queen 
'' ' descriPed by Yenophon,' the Grceks were drawn up i n  a four deep 
" line. At the battle of Cunaxa, a similar or certainly not morc 
" solid formation mas adopted ; the Grcek commanders haring donbt- 
'' less accurately puged the character of the troops opposed to theni. 
'' Later on, when the attacks of a numerous m d r y  and light troops 
'' in an open country had to be pro-dcd against, a hollom square with 
" advanced and rear guard was the formation adopted. And this 
" again was quickly modified 3s soon' as its inconvenience was 
" experienced. Wlicn the progress of the retreat took the ten 
LL thousand into n mountainous country, they seem chiefly to h a w  
" fought in r.mall independent parties or companies, and in the last 
" serious engagement beforc t h y  reached the sea, they adopted with 
" great succcss what was clearlj- a line of company columns," 
And the spirit in which they undertook the march, how thorough ! 
First of all tlicy agree thcrc shall be no surrender; then all super- 
fluous baggage and carriage shall be destroyed ; the army shall first 
see to its commissariat; the general idea of the march is a hollow 
square, baggage and followers in the centre, preceded and followed by 
suitable adranccd and rear guards. 
(6 
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We will quote one passage of Xenophon, as giving another illustra- 
tion of their appreciation of adapting their tactics to the occasion. 
When it was proposed that the ascent of a lofty mountain ridge, 
occupied in great strength, h m l d  bc made in line, Xenophon objected 
to this formation, saying, “ A  h e  mill probably fall into speedy 
4‘ disorder, if only from the rugged nature of the ground, and besides 
‘c this disadrantage, unless it is formed of considerable depth, it is 
‘6 liable to be broken perhaps in several places a t  once, by any resolute 
6‘ onset of the enemy ; and, if to meet this possibility, greater depth be 
‘6 given to the line, our front will be so narrowed that our flanks will 
‘g bc overlapped by the enemy. I therefore propose that we advance 
4‘ in a line of company columns, at such distance from each other, as 
‘g to present a front equal to  the enemy’s. I n  this formation, each 
’I company whilst preserving the general direction, will be able to 
‘I choose its own path up the mountain, and if any one company should 
‘g be hard pressed, it mill receive ready support from those on its right 
6‘ and left, and if even a single company is able to reach the top, w e  
‘‘may be sure theienemy mill no longer be able to hold their 
-round.” 
%enop~ion’s plan was adopted, and was crowned with success. 
€€ow would the course of after history have been turned had all 
Greeks been true to themselves as these conrageous men ? Had they 
.only united against the common foe when Philip of Xaccdon and 
Alexander of Illacedon came, and when the Roman legions came, aa 
they had united in their better d a p  to thrust from them Asiatic 
domination, mould they, could they have brought on themsclvcs 
humiliation and national extinction ? 
But history shows us that there comes a time in the lives of nations, 
when having allowed themselves to sheath their swords, to esteem 
patriotism a burden and virtue an inconvenient restraint, they will 
be quick to recognize in an evil day the want of such, but arc unable 
somehow to rccovcr what they threw away. We must look doubtlees 
apon the heroes of the retreat as an exceptional body of men 
placed in exceptional circumstances ; but had the spirit of these men 
animated Athenians, or Sparens, or The’ans, would they not have 
sent forth their heroes to close the gates of Greece against theinvading 
Mnccdonian ? 
King. Philip of hIacedon, a state half Greek, half Illyrian by origin, 
containing a robust and patriotic people, began by establishing a regular 
army. He was possessed of remarkable ability, and had bcen taught 
by the great Thcban Epaminondas how to construct sn efficient army, 
.and also how to make the best nso of it. When Philip threatened to 
turn upon Athens, the eloquence of Demosthenes was wasted in vain 
attempts to stir up his countrymen to resist the coming danger. 
Alas! Athens, how fallen from her honour and high courage! 
Mercenaries mere hired to take the place of soldiers. Those who 
should have been in the field mere occupied in attending shows and 
spectacles ; and the first philippic of Demosthenes fell on ears that  
were dull of hearing ! But Philip drew nmrcr and nearer, beating in 
detail each separate opponent, until a t  last Athens, in wild alarm 
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rushing into the field, her last vestige of independence was stamped 
out on the fatal day of Chmonen ! 
Philip was now appointed by all the states of Greeeo their 
commander for a general war he was projecting against Persia. But 
dying just at this time, it was reserved for his son, one of. those 
great conquerors who flash across the world like meteors which seem to 
return again centuries after in another girb on another scene, to bring 
together an army which, though not numerous, mas by far the 
strongest force the world had ever seen. The grcat feature of the 
&facedoninn army was the phalanx ; the form of the phalanx was a great 
tactical advance in that day. The ordinary Greek spearman had no 
chance when pitted against it, for they would hare to break through 
three rows of spear points before thcir own short spears could reach 
the front line. It  as admimblycalculated for combats on open 
ground, though we shall see further on that Roman tactics devised 
a way of overcoming it. Tho 3Iacedonian army n-as carefully 
organized. Native Nacedonians composed the phalanx which 
Alexander used as his grand reserre to strike the final blow. Then 
there m s  the guard, armed with spear and shield, also cornposed of 
native Macedonians. The cavalry was divided into heavy and light; 
the heavy carried much amour, and was employed for the shock of 
battle ; the other had light armour and carried lances, being used for 
reconnaissance,. scouring the country, and pursuing beaten troops. 
The king was attended by a band of young Dlacedonian nobles, and 
promotions were made from this body of pages into the staff, outof 
which the king selected his generals and superior officers. Besides 
these he employed regiments of Greeks, both infantry and cn-ialry, 
as well as regiments of irreodars, armed with bows and javelins. 
In addition there was D regular division of the army told off for 
working machines, for hurling stones both in sieges and battles. 
Before Alexander these had only been used to batter walls, but he 
employed them with effect in battles ; and history tells us  later 
on of a battle being actually decided by this ancicnt artillery. Thus 
the Jlacedonian army, though not orer forty thousand strong, 
comprised troops and appliances for e v e y  kind of service. In its 
spirit it was quite unlike the army of a Greek state. In these latter 
the soldiers iwre the citizens themselres who, the mar over, re- 
turned to their ordinary avocations ; the generals also were citizens. 
But Alexander was a fighting Eing, living in the midst of his 
army, and the generals had earned their promotions from the lower 
grades. Thus led and officered, the Macedoninn army was capable 
of performing wonders of bmvery and endurance and, directed 
by the intrepid genius of its chief, would probably without difficulty 
have conquered the world in arms. It is true the enemies of 
Alexander were ‘chiefly Asiatics, so that his winning pitched battles 
wa-s not enough of itself to prove him a p e a t  commander, but the 
readiness in which his troops were always found ; the astonishing 
marches which he caused them to make; the certainty with which 
he carried out his plans, and the boundless confidence his troops placed 
in him, prored him to hare been an extraordinary leader. 
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After Alexander’s death, his empire fell to pieces, and the usual 
disunion and discord in the states of Greccc breaking out afresh, with 
increased intensity, gave them orer an easy prey, no long time 
afterwards to the conquering armies of Rome. 
. A few scattered villages about the base of a hill called Palatine, 
were united under tho cognomen-Rome. We can only conjecture 
as to what race lived there. But  in the development of the progress 
of thesZ people from obscurity to universal dominion, from the omner- 
ship of a few huts, to the government of the h o w n  world, we 
recognise qualities which have never been snrpassed. 
We have not space to follow in the order of history, even in brief, 
the rise, the reign, and the fall of this mighty people. Their carly 
history is involved in doubt. w e  know, hornever, that in  the first 
days of their existence as a people, they always let their love of enter- 
prise go hand-in-hand with prudence and policy. They must have 
been a t  any rate of sturdier stuff than their neighbours, for i t  is 
certain they were nearly always involved in war ; and from the way 
their village. grew to 5 city, and the city to a territory, they must 
hme usually come off. victors. Policy induced them to increase the 
population of their little state by naturalising instead of enslaving 
thew conqucred foes. Thus their strength was superior to their enter- 
prise ; and they h i d  a solid foundation before again extending their 
Rome of the kings in  time disappearcd ; and we come to Rome of 
the consuls, during whose tenure of power immense advances mere 
made in the reform of government and the establishing of fixed ~ews.  
The taking of Veii, the proud rival of Rome, and its equal in  popnle- 
tion, marks the period when the art  of war became improved among 
them. They began to see that instead of only having soldiers, with 
occasional occupation as such in mar time, it was desirable to make 
soldiering a profession. And, from this circumstance they soon 
became an over-match for their neighbours. Except amoni enthu- 
siasts it has alwxp been matter of logic that raw undisciplined levies 
with all the good ivill in  the morId, can neyer be a substitute for  
trained troops in cases of emergency. 
From victory to victory, the Romans, growing as they conquered, 
advanced till 480 years after her capital mas founded, yhen she had 
become mistress of all Italy ; the last struggle before that took plnce 
being with Pyrrhus, king of Epirus, a remarkable general, who landing 
in Italy with a trained force, and with elephants, which mere new to 
the Romans, after a first success was compelled to retire from the field. 
We notice thus the Romans still progressing in the art  of war, for 
Pyrrhus came with a new mode of Farfare, and was accustomed to 
succcss j but they learned after a fist repulse to make his mode of 
warfare recoil on himself. 
A few years after the defeat of Pjmhus, the struggle with Carthage 
supervened. This state, one of the most splendid in the universe, 
having dominion over three hundred cities on the Mediterranean, 
depended for its wealth on its commerce, and on hircdmercennries for 
the defence of both. The first Punic war was in its inception mmked 
arm. 
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by disastcr to the Romans ; but, as they only looked upon repulse as 8 
fnrther incentive to action, the mar terminated in their being able to 
dictate a peace. The second Punic mar brought the country to the 
very brink of min. A supreme genius for war had arisen in the ranks 
of Carthage, and he too saw the advantage which organization and 
discipline confer ; and whcn, after many defeats, the whole might of 
Rome went down before Hannibal a t  Canna, it seemed for a moment 
that her dominion must be a t  an end. Not so ! for the spirit which 
animated Lconidas and his three hundred a t  Thermopylz, ruled a t  
Rome likewise. A general arose on the Roman side, who by his 
Fabian prudence achieved what the valopr of othcrs had failed to 
accomplish. And following him another grcat commander was 
born-as is so often seen-of the crisis; and when Scipio with an 
army carefully trained and excellently led, triumphed a t  Zama, and 
Carthage lay in the dust, there seemed to be no power capable of 
placing a bar to the unircrsal spread of Roman dominion. 
An expiring effort made by Carthage later on, and termed the third 
Punic Tar, ended in its utter annihilation; and the same year 
witnessed the entire reduction of Greece under the power of Rome. 
Beforc the intercourse with Greece, which took place after the 
Punic mars, the Roman people was utterly rude and illitente. I n  the 
earlier periods of the republic, they had little leisure to bestow on the 
cultivation of literature, or of the sciences, or of .philosophy. It mas 
not till tho end of the sixth century from the building of the city, that 
philosophy made its first appeanncc at Rome. When a few learned 
Achmans, banished from their country, had settled in various parts of 
Italy, and applied themselves to dif€using a taste for studies hitherto 
d m o m  to the Romans, the elder citizens regarded these pursuits 
with an unfavoumble cye. Jealous of the introduction of foreigii 
manners with foreign studies, the Senate banished thc Greek 
philosophers from Rome. While the manners of the Romans had yet 
n tincture of ancient swerity, the stoical system prevailed, and the philo- 
sophy of Epicurus mas unknown. It mas introdnced with luxury, and 
kept pice in its advancement with the corruption of manners. Cineas 
havlng discoursed on the tenets of Epicurns a t  the table of Pyrrhns, 
Fabricins exclaimed, ‘(May the enemies of Rome crer entertain such 
“ principles.” Yet these principles were in a short time from that 
period but too currcnt among her own citizens. The manners of the 
Romans in the early ages of the republic were so different from thosc 
of the latter time, that one should be led to suppose some very extra- 
ordinary causes to have co-operated to produce so remarkable a 
change; yet the transition is easy to be accounted for. A spirit of 
temperance and frugality is the characteristic of every infant estab- 
lishment. A virtuous simplicity of manners and a rigour of military 
discipline paved the way for the extension of the Roman arms, arid for 
their prodigious conquests ; these conquests introduced wealth, luxury, 
and corruption. 
In the early times, the Patricians, when in the country, forgot the 
distinction of ranks and laboured in  the cultivation of -their fields like 
the meanest Plebeians. Tbo town was visited only every ninth or  
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marketJay. In  those times of virtuous simplicity, says Sallust, 
6 6  Doiiii m i l i t i q u e  boni mores colebantur. Duabus artibus aiiclacia in 
6 6  bello u b i  par euenerat equifate sepue rempue puhlicanb curabaiit.” But 
when, in conscquence of this very discipline and these manners, the 
Romans had extended their dominions, they imported with the wcalth 
of tho conquered nations their tastes, their manners, and their viccs. 
In the end of the Republic, pleasure and amusement mere the darling 
objects of a11 ranks of the citizens ; they sought no more than “panem 
I‘ et circemes.” 
We alluded just now to the final extinction of Carhhage as the 
result of tho third Punic mar. So far, thc virtues and qualities which, 
however mised with indefensible ambition and thirst for aggrandise- 
ment at whatever cost, had lifted a little gronp of uncultivated people 
from the dust to occupy a lofty seat of government, had not sensibly 
deteriontcd. I SO long as other gladiators descended into the arena the 
Romans mere ever sharpening their smords ; but in the absence of 
danger the taste begnn to spread for the rewards victory had sccured 
them. With acquaintance with foreign manners and lax customs, the 
taste for wealth and luxury set in. The national character of tho 
Romans seems to hare undergone its most remarkable change for the 
worse from the time of the destruction of their r i d ,  Carthage. 
Sallust assigns the cause, “ A n t e  Cartliagilient deletam,-met1ts hostilis 
“ in bonk artibuseiuitatem retinebat. S e d  ubi i l la formiclo nieiitibus decessit, 
scilicet en pice sccuiitlce res ainant, lasciaia a f p e  siqerbia invasere.” 
The first f r u i t s  of such were soon borne in civil dissensions, which 
culminated in the strife of rivals for the dictatorship, until Julius 
Cmar established his own supremacy. Then, as narrated inimitably 
by himself, came thc brilliant wars in  which he commanded against 
Germans, Gauls and Britons, and mherc the unquenchable valour of 
the most perserving and tenacious patriotism, and occasionally no 
mean skill and cunning failed to  avert, if they sometimes retarded 
their inevitable defeat. For the Roman armies mere now not only 
directed by consummate generalship, but their discipline, organization, 
and drill were of a high order. 
.From the prcdigious success which attended their arms, and that 
dominion they acquired over the greatest part of the known world, 
it seems a natunl inference that they must have carried the military 
ar t  to a higher degree of perfection than any other of the contemporary 
nations. Vegetius cxprcssly assigns their extensive conquests to that 
cause alone. It is the discipline of an army that makcs the multitude 
.act as one man. It likewise increases the courage of troops, for each 
indiridual confides in the steady cooperation of his fellow. From the 
constant practice of athletic exercises, the Romans were inured from 
infancy to hardness and fatigue, and bred to that species of life which 
a soldier leads, in the most active campaign, in the field. 
The levies mere made annually by the tribes, called out and divided 
into their respectivc number of centuries, each century presenting by 
rotation as many soldiers as there were legions intended to be raised, 
and the tribunes of the several legions taking thcir turn by rotation 
in the selection of the men presented by the centuries. The number 
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of soldiers in a legion mas mrious ; a t  different periods from t h e e  to ten 
and eleven thousand. Among the ancient nations there were usua11y 
but two different arrangement of troops in order of battle, the one the 
“ phalans ” or close arrangement in parallelogram, intersected only by 
great divisions, a disposition commonlj- used by the Greeks ; tho other 
the “ quincuw ” or chcquer, consisting of small companies disposed 
in thrcc straight lines, with alternatespaces between them equal to the 
space occupied bx each companx. In the first line mere the “ Aasfati,” 
in the second the “principes,” both these armed with the heavy 
javelin, s i ~ o r d  and buckler; in the third the “triarii,” with long 
spear. On the flanks of the first line were the cavalry; in  front 
of the line Kere the light-armed troops irho skirmished in front of the 
main body. The advantages of this arrangement were that the line 
of battle could be three times formed with fresh troops, and that it 
was more fitted than any other for rapid changes of movement. Not- 
withstanding these advantages, the “ qzci?2cuna ” went into disuse 
towards the end of the RepubIic ; and from that time rarious arrange- 
ments of the legion mere used according to circumstances. The tactics 
of the Romans attained their greatest excellence during the Punic 
wars. Hannibal mas a great master of the art  of manccuvring troops, 
and the Romans profited by the experience of his ability. The battle 
of Cannie, as described by Polsbius, aKords signal evidence of the 
great talents of the Carthaginian general. The ar t  of entrenchment 
was carried to great perfection by the Romans, particularly by Julius 
Caesar. In the times of the Empire, the Romans maintained their 
distant conquests, not only by their armies, but by their fleets, which 
were moored in the large rivers and bays, and generally preserved a 
fixed station, as did the legions. 
After the death of Augustus, there occurs an ugly list of emperors, 
with only here and there a bright exception among them. Though 
some maintained, and even increased for a while, if  possible, the 
prestige of tho Roman arms, yet as years went on, and in proportion 
as weakness in the central authority paralysed the extremities, where 
the boundaries of the empire had constantly to be defended by the 
sword against fresh incursions of barbarians, the more distant armies 
frequently mutinied, and disastrous civil wars, to the profit of 
neighbouring peoples, arose. When, moreover, the timid policy of 
Constantine, in  i~shiing to take from his o-im soldiers the power of 
rebellion, prompted him to intermix with his own troops large 
numbers of Scythians, Goths and Germans, the body of the army 
seemed to lose what esprit de corps remained to it. For awhile the 
vigorous exercise of despotic authority sufficed to maintain an 
appearance of order in the vast mass of heterogeneous parts; .but 
the real Rome, with its energy and dignity, its heroic and patriotic 
firtues, was already fading into the past. 
We may reduce to one ultimata cause, the various circumstances 
that produced the decline and fall of this once magnificent fabric. 
The ruin of the Roman empire mas the inevitable consequence of its 
greatness. The extensionof its dominion relaxed the vigour of its 
frame; the vices of the conquered nations infected the victorious 
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legions ; and foreign luxuries corrupted their commanders ; selfish 
interest supplanted patriotism ; the martial spirit was purposely 
debased by the emperors, who drcaded its effect on their own power, 
and the whole mass thus weakened and enervated, fell an easy prey 
to the torrent of barbarians which overwhelmed it. 
Thc chapter of ancient history closes with the extinction of the 
Roman empire in the West. 
We. have now briefly sketched the rise to dominion of four great 
peoples of antiquity, and the p d u a l  decay of their power. In each 
case, identical causes were a t  mork, contributing to the cementing and 
to the loosening of the fabric; in the case of A.ssJTia aud Persia, 
must be added another cause, namely, the inherent fecbleness of the 
Asiatic character, and the proneness of all peoples of the race to 
instant disintegration from any momentarx weakness of the central 
authority; in that of the states of Greece, disunion paved the "ray 
for foreign intervention; while Rome, corrupt as either, and bankrupt 
of virtue and patriotism, sank from its inability to sustain the weight 
of its own empire. 
Turning now to modern history, ire find that after the fall of Rome 
no state occupied her scat of pre-eminence. The liEe of the world is 
thereafter illustr&xl in the dispersion, estinction or rise to supremacy 
of the decentraliscd masses of the empire. There \ms space over the 
vast area of the Roman dominion for the establishment of many power- 
ful kingdoms. 
Of all the causes contributing to the formation of the several great 
and independent peoples of Europe, none have been in their operation 
more pomerf ul than the hold which thc .Christian religion obtained 
over the minds and consciences of mankind. The proclamation of tho 
r e d  equality of all the lace of humankind, is the legitimate support 
of that spirit of indepcndence in every man's breast whose noblest 
exponent is patriotism and negation of self. It was not possible that 
a corrupt Pagan empire, which aimed a t  e n s l a ~ n g  the minds as well 
as the bodies of men, could for ever hold in bondage peoples who were 
learning that the alphabet of the new religion they mere erer-p-here 
embracing, sct forth the emancipation of tho human mind from the 
thraldom of idolatrous worship, and directed it towards an intelligent 
reality! A glance a t  thc map of the Europe of today, supplies a 
partial answcr to the question, which powers in modern times have 
attained to pre-eminence in arms. How they managed to attain 
supremacy, how the extension of that  supremacy has been limited, 
demands a w-ider explanation than the manner of the rise of Greece o r  
Rome. 
As regards ortension of dominion in modern times, that has been 
Tery generally met by combination to limit it. Hence the term, 
'' balance of power," the principle of which has been long in action. 
In the days of Rome there would bo no balance of power where ercry- 
thing was absorbed by her resistless strength. And if me woader that 
modern states havo many of them already attained, without showing 
decided symptoms of decrepitude, a length of existence exceeding that 
allotted to even vigorons Rome, and ask ourselres how is this, and why 
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have not the corruptions of lusury in the midst of a wealthy and 
polished civilization nndermined modern life as they did that of Greece 
and Rome, we find the answer in this, that the religion and insti- 
tutions of modern times are tho causes of the longer lease of life. 
The moral education of man, not founded as before on a doubtful 
and false philosophy, but spreading on the wings of an enlightened 
creed, and the g r a d d ,  w r y  gradual indeed, but still growing appre- 
ciation and extension of measured freedom, ham been for long silently 
at work, purifyng and educating the moral conscience of the more 
civilized communities. " I n  Europe,'' s a p  Alison, " it is evident that 
" a more durable order of things has been induced with the free spirit 
" which from the days of Agamemnon seems to have bccn the distinc- 
" tivc mark of the race of Japhet. Though tho seeds of evil are not 
" less generally implanted in thcm than elsciThere among mankind, 
" yet they are combatcd with a \<pour, and countcracted by a salient 
" principle of life unknown in any other quarter of the globe. But 
" nothing warrants the assertion that these superior powers of vitality 
" haw extinguished the seeds of mortality, or that the communities 
." of Europe hare attained such a degree of stability, as to be able to 
" defy, alike thc shock of external disaster, and the mouldering of 
'' internal delay. This may with confidence be affirmed, that length of 
" life is giren to us, cqually as to our predecessors, just in proportion 
to duration of public and private virtues, and that the only elixir 
A' of life which can be given to empires, is to be found in the virtue 
" and resolution of their inhabitants." 
But coming more directly to the term, pre-eminence in war, has it 
been rencherl in the modern world through the same channels of 
patriotism, eiicrgj-, endurance, as in other times ? Certainly. And there 
is nothing surer than that all which contributes to moral discipline 
and elevation of character, especially when aecompmiied by the 
diffusion of a wholesome cducation, contributes also to tlie strengthening 
.of those qualities which attend pre-eminence in arms. For nndoubtedly 
as war must be generally deplored, none but philanthropists whose 
enthusiasm outruns their judgment, can possibly suppose that as man 
is a t  present constituted, wars can ever cease altogether. LL The great 
" and lasting effect of mar," says Alison, " is to counteract the con- 
" centixtion of human interest upon individual interest, to awaken the 
" patriotic and generous affections, to rouse that general ardour, which 
-'' spreading from breast to breast, obliterates for a time the selfishness 
"of private ambition, and leads to the elevated condition of heroic 
" feelings." 
However deteriorated the Roman armies had become at the time of 
their last overthrow by their barbarian foes, they had a vast experience 
and knowledge of mar, a regular organization, and an intelligent 
system of tactics. When their armies were swept away, we may m y  
that war as an ar t  retro,pded, and we find through many centuries 
after, nothing a t  all compainblc in the military' institutions of 
the ever-marring natious with the scientific methods that preceded 
them. 
But of what kind were the wars in the centuries succeeding the fall 
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of Rome ? and I i o ~  were the)- co?ductetl? The European world was 
agitated by the migrations of hordes of undisciplined warriors. 
Of course the march of entire peoples left a roid for others to fill, and 
so created a general disturbance, not only within, but far beyond the 
boundaries of Europe. The contests' carried on mere naturally no 
more than a clasli of courageous men far more distinguished by 
their physical prowess than by their military skill. These \)-ars Wore 
cssentinllj- for plunder and conquest. 
After this period, a new system of policy, first inaugurated amongst 
tho Gauls, by degrcw oxtcnded itself over most of the nations of 
Europe-the feudal system. By this cxprcssion is properly meant 
thnt tenure 011 mliicli the proprietors of land held their possessions, 
Ilaiiidy, an' obligation to perform military service whenever required 
by the chief to whom they owed allegiance. When Gaul ~ y a s  orenun 
by the F~miks, a gre:it part of the land was possessed on this tenure 
bj- the Roman soldiery, as the rest was by the natix-c Gauls. The 
conquerors, accustomed to the same policj-, natunlly adopted it on the 
partition of their IICW conquests, each man on receiving his share, 
becoming bound to military service as a condition necessarily annexed 
to territorial property. 
The contests I)ct\vren the feudal lords among themselves and their 
contest with the smmign,  were calculated to produce, as indeed was 
the case, general amrchj- and confusion. 
The advent of a most rcmarkablc man and so-mreign: Charlcmape, 
who founded an immense empire of tho West, comprising France, 
Germany, and Italy, served to restore some d e p e o  of order in these 
countries. He divided tlie empire into prorinces, assembled Parlia- 
ments, and grave to the clergy, nobles, and people each 3 share in 
legislation. But tlie empire fell to pieces a t  the dcatli of its founder, 
and all again became disorder. Germany was n prej-' to incessant 
factions and civil war, the fruit of contested claims of sovcrcignty. 
France was equally weak and nnarcliical. Spain was ravarrcd by the 
strife betwxn Moors and Christians. England was bend& to thc 
Norman invasion. But distmcted as appears the situation of Europe 
about this period (lo%), one g e n t  project gave a species of union to 
the discordant mass This was the p n d  design, long entertained by 
tho Popes, of arming all Christendom and rxterminating the infidels 
from the Holy Land. Tliese expeditions were carried out by immense 
multitudes of ambitious nobles, with all their dependents, eager for 
enterprise and adventure. But when the fanaticism of the Crescent, 
thrust back from Europe, T ~ S  assailed in its stronghold by the 
enthusiasm of the Cross, each side found it could only hold its own 
ground bj- each keeping its particular field. 
War as an art  had certnirily retrograded, and we have littlo to learn 
from the history of the mars of those times, unless it he how- powerful 
.z lever is fanaticism, and how great things men arc capable of when 
inspired by noble and chivalrous sentiments. 
Chivalry arose naturally from the condition of society in those ages 
in which it prevailed. Among the Germanic nations, the profession 
of arms mas esteemed the sole employment that deserved thc name 
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of manly or  honourable. To protect the honour and contend for tho 
favour of the fair, mas the best employ and highest merit of an 
accomplished knight. 
Chivalry, whether it began with the Moors or Normans, attainedits 
perfection a t  the period of the Crusades, which presented a noble 
object of adventure, and a boundless field of military glory. The 
bards and romancers sung the praises of the. kmights, and recorded 
their exploits with a thousand circumstances of fabulous embellish- 
ment. With the introduction of gunpo\.vder, we come to the gradual 
extinction of chivalry, and to the formation of standing a'rmies *th 
regular organization. After this, little of what IW call progress r a s  
made, xhich is to be attributed to the imperfection of the weapons; 
the imperfection of means of communication; the absence of the 
stu&y of war as an art  ; the supposed obligation of submitting plans 
and operations to definite rigid rules ; the poverty of the countries; 
and the absence of any great innovator. 
By this 
'( is understood the old manner of conducting a methodical war with 
" armies in tents, with their supplies at hand, engaged in watching 
'' each other ; one besieging a city, the other covering it ; one perhaps 
" cndcarouring to acquire a small province ; the other counteracting 
" i ts  efforts by oeenpying strong points. Such was war from the 
" middle ages to the era of the French Revolution. It xas  the fashion 
" for armies to cstablish large dcp6ts as they moved, and live from 
" these. This interfered of course greatly with operations, restricting 
" the troops within a distance from the depdts depending upon the 
"means of transportation, the rations they could carry, and the 
" number of days necessary for waggons to go to the dcp6ts and 
" return to camp.". (Jomini). 
" While the strategy on both sides mas hampered by conrentional 
" restrictions, the tactics of the battle-qound partook of the same kind 
'' of conrentional formations and morements. Before the French 
" Rerolution, all the infantry was collected in a single battle-corps, 
" drawn up in txvo lines, each of xhich had a riqht and left wing. 
I' The caralry was placed on the wings, and the unwleldy artillcry mas 
'' distributed along the front of each line. The army camped 
'' together, marching by lines o r  mings ; and as there were two cnralry 
'' and two infantry wings, if the march Tas by wings, four columns 
"were thus formed. This monotonous but simple formation  as 
'' seldom deviated from, and no bcttcr could have been devised as war 
'' was carried on in those days." 
During the Revolution great changes transpired ; and in 1793, when 
assailed from without and within, the old sxstem was completely 
changed. Thoroughly aroused, France threw one million of men in 
fourteen armies upon her enemies. These armies had neither tents, 
provisions, nor money. On their marches they bivou?cked or Tere 
quartered in towns ; their mobility u-as increased and became a means 
of SUCCESS. Their tactics changed also; the troops mere put in 
columns, which threw out a pmt of their force as skirmishers to cover 
them. This system a t  first met with a success beyond all expectation, 
" For centuries wars called ' of position ' were carried on. 
(Jomini). 
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and thoroughly disconcerted the methodical Austrian and Prussian 
troops as well as their generals. 
The campaign of 1800 by Napoleon in Italy, marked a new era in 
the conception of plans of campaign and lines of operations. He 
adopted bold objective points, which looked to nothing less than the 
destruction of whole armies. The orders of battle were less extended, 
and the more rational ofganization of armies in large bodies of two or 
three divisions \\-as adopted. The system of modern strategy  as 
merely corollaries to the great problem solved in  1800. It ~sas- 
when everything has been said in praise of all other great gencmls, 
from the time of the .introduction of gunpowder to his OKn day- 
Napoleon vlio rally gare the cozqde-grace to the old-system of 
carrying on wars of position. He was the great innovator lvhose 
genius first realized in practice? howxcr much it may have been 
desired and foreseen before his time, the gain to thc art of war by thc 
adoption of &.system of marches. 
During the Revolution, dcpSts of supply were abandoned from 
necessity, the armies lived byreqnisitions, and often by plunder and 
pillage, after the fashion of Czsnr, who said that “War filiould support 
‘6 war.” It is easy to concciw how great may be the rapidity and 
impetuosity of an army where everything depends only on the strength 
of the soldiers’ legs. This system gave Napoleon great advantages, 
but he abused it by applying it on too large a scale and to countries 
Tohere it was impracticable. 
The progress made in the art  of war since those times,’l:as bccn 
greater than in the f i r e  hundred years prcceding his day. The 
Prussian army, ~ h k h  conqucrccl in the war of 1870, was as superior to 
tho armies of fifty years ago as those w x c  to the armies of Francis 
the First and Charles the Fifth. Superior by the armament of 
its infantry; the intelligent use of its cavalry; the capacity and 
scientific attainments of its artillery ; by the instruction of its officers; 
the education of the men gencrlly and professionally; and the 
careful training and high acquirements of the general staff of the 
army. 
We lua%-c purpose1;r only touched in the lightest way on the successive 
changes which the spirit or the inrcntion of the times have made in 
the manncr of conducting war. TVc Kish simply to  point out that 
since the extinction of the Roman dominion, the nations have been 
called to practise war under diffcrcnt conditions, more or less pro- 
gressive. The question is, which of the rarious nations have under- 
stood best horn to be successful in war, 11-haterer the manner of 
conducting war a t  any particular time \\-as. 
Three great nations of modern times fulfil the conditions xhich 
entitle them to be considcrcd as having been pre-eminent in war. 
These are England, France, and Germany. We csclude others for 
various reasons ; the Scandinavian kingdoms hare indccd prcservcd 
their independence, and when their armies have fought they have 
fought admirably; but thc future of their nation is perhaps yct to 
come j their vast country is but wry sparsely peopled, and its wealth 
bere fully .developed, and the campaigns of 1805 and 1806 7j-el-e 
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little explorcd and developed. Russia which has the clement in her. 
of a stupendous power, and which is so formidable because she a n  
always strike out, and rcpulscd, cannot be effectually followed up, her 
real day of prc-eminence and overshadowing might has yet to come ! 
Turkey was for a considerable timc n most formidable pomer ; but her 
impotence for political progrcss, and her comparative feebleness beyond 
her own frontier, prccludc our classing her with those states which 
acquired commanding influence in Europc. In addition to this she 
does not fulfil the conditions of pre-eminence which me have noted 
to be essential. Notwithstanding thc passive courage and physical 
strength of hcr race, mc cannot say that it is characterized by innate 
Figour and energy. Secondly, shc has failed to develop the resources 
of her magnificent country. Tliirdly, her moral and inteIlcctua1 
progress has becn d. Fourthly, she has not kept pacc with othcr 
powers in carrying out the improrcmcnts which timc, experience, and 
inrention hare made in the art of war. The history of Turkey simply 
shows us that grcat thifigs may occasionall? be accomplishcd by the 
exhibition of n reckless heroism due to fanaticism and by the display 
of those really great qualities, sobriety, patience and obedience, which 
distinguish the Turkish soldier; but thcsc do not alone sufficc when 
thcrc exists still stronger counteracting agencies. Italy is only now 
united as a pomer, and has yet to show of what stuff she is made. In 
the centuries which witnessscd her divisions, her  exploits in arms mere 
very rarely remarkable, though 7vc must except the glorious d a p  of 
the republics of Genoa and Vcnicc. 
Of all the states of Europc, Spain has had the finest opportunities, 
and made the least of thcm. We stated a t  the outset that as a general 
rule a state that wished to maintain its supremacy, must first rccognise 
the necessif!y of energetic working towards that end. Secondly, i t  
would dcpcnd rcry much on her gcogmphical position whcther she 
exercised a commandiiig influence. Thirdly, she must, to exercise 
such, develope hcr internal rcsourccs. Spnin has not recogniscd 
the necessity of work, inasmuch as she lias never made the requisite 
bustained cffort to  bc on a par with other nations; ncithcr has she 
utiliscd her magnificent position astridc on the ocean and the 
3leditcrmnean; and as for hcr rcsources, they lie under the carth 
unminecl, and on the surface of the earth ungnthered. Such glory as 
shc had as a nation first bceame conspicuous in the reign of 
Ferdinand and Isabelln; but her rcnown was already on tho manc 
under Philip the Second! HOW much was owing to accident a i d  
estcrnals-to the possession by Charles the Fifth of thc Neiv World, 
of Italy, thc Lorn Countries, and Germany? How soon, as thcsc 
dropped off and Spain was left by hcrsclf, did povcrty and weakness, 
her normal and present condition, rctnrn ? It is stmngc, but true, 
that that country has ne-rcr produced one great general. " Spain,'' 
says Justin, " never in a long series of ngcs produced one grcat 
'cgcnernl, except Viriatus, and hc was but a guerilla chicf. The 
6'  people indeed h a w  honest hearts and vigorous arms, but, as in the 
u Eastern fable. a head is wanting to thc body." It xas  D remark of 
the Duke of Wellington, during the Peninsular war, "that thc rcvo- 
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( 6  lution in Spain had not produced o m  m a n  with any haon-ledgc of thc 
‘ 6  rcal situation of his country, ancl that it really appeared as if they 
J,-crc all drunk, thinking and talking of any objects but Spain !” 
And again hc says, ‘ L  I rcally bclicw tlicrc is not a man in the c0untr-j 
6‘ who is capablc of comprehending, much lcss conducting any great 
6~ concern.’’ 
This is no placc to glorify our O w n  peop1c a t  tho cspcnse of others ; 
and instead of boasting of our past, ~e English haw quite enough to 
do to takc care for the future, and prcparc with forcsight and lt-isdom 
for any trials to d i c h  x e  may bc subjected. But history cannot be 
silent, it speaks in thc tongues of crery  land; and if x-c I J - O U ~ C ~  
prepnrc for thc futurc, mc must learn to set a, right T-alnc on thc facts 
of thc past. T’Vc would digress here a littlc to rcmark that those of 
US who study military history, seeking to arrirc a t  tlic truth, must not 
IIC discouragccl by the manifold contixdictions n-0 meet in  cndcarour- 
ing  to reconcilc thc discrcpancics of authors in various countries, and 
thc illogical conclusions at  which t h y  frequently arrirc, Wc know 
that many authors, English as well as others, liavc only been able to 
sec objccts from thcir own point of view. Thc campaign of Waterloo 
1m.s long D notable instancc of this. How differently do English writers 
trcnt that campaign sincc additioual light has bccn thrown upon it. 
Comparc thc latc Colonel Chesncy’s admirablc mono,pph on thc war 
of 1815, nit11 any work preceding it. SCC the progress made towards 
accurately dividing the truth. Onc thing we may bc certain of, that no 
mnttcr horn brilliantly authors may trcnt historical events ; howercr 
much thc writers of any pniticular nation may gloss orcr thc defeats 
of it armies and esaggcmtc its successes, the calm sifting cosmopo- 
litan judgmcnt of posterity d l  bc ablc in thc n s t  majority of eases 
t o  wcigh truth against error in thc nicest balancc. What d l l  arail 
thcn that which Kapicr, alluding to writcrs of thc Lamartinc and 
Thicrs class, calls “ pages sparkling with paste brilliants, but minting 
‘‘ thc i ta l  jcwcl, truth ? ” If n-c may with rcasonablc probability opinc 
that 31-c harc prctty accnratcly gauged the character of Augustus, or 
estimated thc d u c  of the gencralship of Hannibal or Czsar, with 
what absolutc certainty will our descendants be ablc to put a right 
intcrprctation on thc great ercnts of our day! 
But 11-e-and n-c say with pcculiar satisfaction wc English n-ritcrs, 
arc prctty generally Inoi-in to bc earnest in tho search of historic 
truth j ~ r c  h - i c  thcreforc a fairly char light by which to guidc us in 
discorering what ~ m s  really fact in  the p a t  cwnts of tho past. 
How many historians of other nations hnvc cndca-ioured, by ignoring 
facts and slurring orcr results, to diminish thc reputation acquircd by 
thc arms of Enghnd. Those ~ h o  have ncrcr looked into Spanish 
literaturc ~ o u l d  bc pcrfcctly amazed to rcad thc accounts of the 
Peninsular as understood by thcir historians, and to learn horn 
littlc the English contributed t o  the delircrancc of the Peninsula. 
To quote two instances, it-c all know thc true story of Albuera. Who 
could recognisc the battle in the rLsicni6 gi-icn of it by the Spanish 
historian Schepclcr, who gra~cly asserts, on Portuguese anthority, 
“ tho Spanish fought l&c lions, tho Portugnesc l a c  serpents, thc 
TOT,. 9x1. 2 JI 
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English not a t  all.” According to another historian, Xadoz, tho 
English were cared a t  Albuera, by the Spainards, 2nd the action is 
termed “one of the most signal feats of arms of the Spanish people;? 
I n  the history of Naldonado, vritten to order by thching, the English 
arc usually left out of sight, the Spanish military conduct throughout 
humbled Bonapartc, and c c  surpassed in sublimity anything in Greek 
“ or Roman history ! ’’ 
Can any of these so-called historians for n, moment imagine that his 
Tersionof events will bcacccptcdany~\;llerebe~oiid thc palc of ignomncc? 
To take another nation. Do the eminent French soldiers who fought 
ag ins t  us in almost crcry fight from Rolein to Waterloo; docs 
General Foy, in  his story of the war, in which bc attributes tho 
s n ~ ~ e s s e s  of the English, with their slow, dull organization, to “beef 
“ and rum,” and when hc s a p  that honour is a motirc too much aborc 
their appreciation, and that they lack the csclusirc derotion to it of 
thc French ! Does any one supposc that in his inmost heart hc bclicred 
tlic splendid soldiership hc hod so often witnessed to be due to beef, 
rum and an insufficieni scnsc of honour! Does my one suppost? 
Geneid Foy considcred Wellington to bc what he describes him, “ 717L 
“ ghz6ral culgaire, d‘uiw porfc‘e ordinaim i”’ Could such a rerdict bc 
accepted anywhere by sober impartial persons in search of the truth ? 
Where should we be as a nation if 
thc result of our campaigns and battles had bccn diffcrcnt from what 
thcF were. I f ,  for instance, Crhcj-, or Blcnhcim, or Vittoria did not 
end in our favour, how is it that as a conscquencc of those and other 
actions, too numerous to mention, we obtained what ITC fought for ? 
With all the gcnius which positirclx illumines c r c g  other page of 
the despatches of Napoleon, they arc not to bc compared for their 
sterling raluc with those of Wellington. Emerson, irith more point 
than politeness, describes Napoleon as ‘: n, boundless liar,” and certainly 
his proclamations, bulletins, despntchcs, and lcttcrs rereal clearly that 
he wonld stick a t  no falsehood when any object n-as to be p ined  by 
it, or when truth was unpalatable. 
How is it possiblc that a Frenchman, if hc rends no other literature 
than his own, can form a truc estimntc of crents when lie has little 
but romance to fall back on? TVlien there arises among them a, man, 
like Colonel Charms, who dnrcs to speak thc truth, hc is s t ra ightxy 
set  doirn as unpatriotic, and as unablc to apprcciato things a t  their 
real raluc ! 
The despatches of Wellington arc a model for all timc as a calm, 
impartial appreciation of cnrrcnt crcnts, and a t  thc samc timc an 
cncyclopzcdin of administrativc and military science. Ercry line 
“ bears that honest English impress-Trutli-~~~thout which there cnn 
I‘ bc no real manliness or greatness.” Since the ar t  of war has of late 
years rcceired such an impulsion, thcrc has risen up in our midst Q 
school of military critics Tho, at  the samc timc that they make no 
prctcnsion to infallibility, arc keen after the truth, i d 1  not accept any 
man’s, rersion of crcnts without careful examination ; and whcncvcr 
possible, determine questions by thc inesomblc rules of logic. 
It n-as a remarkable prophecy of Colonel Chesney in 1868, and 
We English appeal to  results. 
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was v e g  speedily fulfilled, that if  the French, lured on by ambition, 
confident in  and boasting of their oirn prowess, were to meet lyith 
g p r e  disaster, it rionld bc in IL great ?aeasurc due to the false ideas 
-\i.hich men of thdThiers' school of history had inculcated among them. 
The cause of England is best subserrcd by " the truth, the ~ ~ - h o l c  
(( truth, and nothing but the truth" being related of her history. 
And truthful, plain-spoken history is tho legitimate, and not only 
legitimate but directly cfficacious support of O, nation which for CCn- 
turies hzs been prc-eminent in war. 
To return. We said that three great pcopIcs hare attained to 2nd 
maintained pre-eminence in Europe during screral centuries, the 
Gcrmans,'thc French, and the English. We include under the head 
Germans thosc of Austria, Prussia, and the German Confederation 
genemlly. In the threc peoples -m have named, rigour of race stands 
out prominently. Cirilization, religion, and the lapso of centuries 
hm-c failed to obliterate certain fcaturcs of character which early 
historians statc crcn then xcrc peculiarly thcirs. " The history and 
( 4  manners of thc Gothic nations aro curious from their in0ucncc on 
"the constitutions and national character of most of the modern 
'( kingdoms of Europe. As the present inhabitants of these kingdoms 
'6 areamixedrace, compounded of theGoths nndof thenations ivhom thej- 
'( subdued, the laws, manners and institutions of the modern states arc 
'( the result of this conjunction; and in so far as these are different from 
'6 the usages preralent before, they arc probably to be traced from the 
'( ancient manners and institutions of those northern tribes. What- 
'' eyer differences of manncr3 therc may havo been among the Tarions 
I' tribes of Gothic origin, the great features of their character appear 
'' to have been thc samc. Kature, cducntion and prorailing habits all 
'' concurred to form them for an intrepid and conquering people." 
The manners of the Franks merc similar to thosc of the other 
Germanic nations described by Tacitus. They m r e  originally those 
tribes of Germans inhabiting thc l o m r  districts of the Rhine and 
Weser. Though the Franks reduced tho Ganls to absolute subjection, 
yet they left many in possession of their lands, likcxise in the use of 
their existing laws, and the Franks haring early adopted the religion 
of tho natire Gauls, in a short spacc of time the trio nations -irere 
thoroughly incorporated. The history of modern France and Germanx 
as separate peoples begins rrith the trcaty of Vcrdun in 843. Germany 
x-as then finally separated from tho Empire of the Franks, and em- 
bodied into a monarchy or gorernmcnt under its own kings or chiefs. 
The history of England begins really rrith the Xorman conquest, as 
we ham then all the elements of which our people is composed. The 
government of the Saxons of Germanj-xho had conquered the Britons 
was the ,same \\-ith that of all thc ancient Germanic nations. They 
were behind the Normans in'cvcry point of cix-ilization, so the conquest 
led to  material improvement in arts, science, government, and lanx 
I Wc nil1 just glanco a t  the various and progressire forms of gorcrn- 
ment in each of the three great nitions w-c haw named, to enable us 
to apprehend ' certain salient situations in general histoi*J, There the 
characteristics of each people stand forth conspicuously. 
2 x 2  
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Thc first stonc in thc foundation of thc liberties of England n-m 
!.lid b~ the pcoplc thcmsclvcs, when they dcclarcd thcmanner in which 
t i q  intended to bc governed. Xagna Charta is the corner stom of the 
civilization of England. From that timc, Whatever mc may Judge of 
the actual governmcnt, which n-as occasionally most arbitrary and 
dcspotical, the constitution of England n-as that of B h i t e d  
monarchy. The next mernorablc cra in thc growth of the English 
constitution, rras the rcign of Henry the Third, when rcpresentativcs 
of the pcople, deputies of counties and boroughs, wcrc admitted to 
Parliament. The constitution continued advancing till its progress 
r;as suspended by thc ciril wars of Pork andhncaster. The rights of 
both princc andjpeople ricrc thcn forgotten, and the Tudor race 
escrcised despotic sway. Aftcrrards thc talents of Elizabeth cnablcd 
licr to maintain with a, high hand the powx and dignity of the 
Cro-sn. I n  hcr r c i p  thc‘rcligion of England bccamestationary. Tho 
cra of the Rcformation must bc regarded as thcit in which thc great 
JIngna Chnrta of conscicncc was rion nnd another glorions stonc 
addcd to the foundation of English liberties. Charles the First, 
cndon-cd with a certain energy of eharactcr, x-ias imprudent in exerting 
with rigour an authority hc had not sourccs to support. He mas com- 
pelled to sign the “Pctition of Rights;” and aftcrrards bcing 
unxilling to conccdc morc, appeal was madc to thc sword and the 
contest cndcd by the dcstrnction of thc constitution. Thc despotism 
which succecdcd disgusted thc nation, which soon rcturncd with high 
satisfaction to a limited monarchy. New cncronchmcnts undcr 
Charles thc Second produced ncw limitations, and thc Act of 
“ ITabens C o r p s  ” g a ~ e  final sccurity to pcrsonal liberty. The violent 
invasion of thc constitution by James thc Second, bnnishcd himsclf 
and posterity from tho throne, and produced n ncm and solemn 
contract hetwccn king and pcoplc. Thc rcrolution may he rcgardcd 
as thc final settlement of the English constitution. There is nothing 
niorc ccrtnin than that the spirit of frecdom xrhich has intcrpcnEtratcd 
all her institutions has been the foundntion of England‘s grcatness. 
Thc sobriety of tho national judgmcnt amounting, pcrhnps, to a certain 
sloirncss of apprchension, hy bccn mainly instrumental in regulating 
thc progress of the nation so as to aroid bcing hurried into ext,rcmcs. 
And thc cnterprising spirit which has prompted such rast multitudes 
to seck fortunc in colonisation, not only has thus afforded an outlet 
for cnergics which could not find scopc for their cmploymcnt at home, 
but has been thc means of sprcading owr  the rrorld in an unexampled 
degrcc, thc s2mc institutions, la-ss, and rcligion, rh ich  ham provcd 0, 
sourcc of such strength and such happiness to tho mother country. 
It Tere absurd and falsc to say that thc history of England is that of 
n people a l ~ a y s  s-iraycd by lofty principlcs of morality and philan- 
thropy. Our freedom has 
bxn only grzdually derclopcd, as ITC noticed just no-ir, in thc course of 
long centuries. England posscssed thc gnarantccs ‘of freedom long 
Ixfore she cnjoycd its realities. Shc has had monarchs as bad, judges 
a s  corrupt, statesmen as unprincipled, as most other nations hare h d  
t o  cndurc. The -cars of England haye bccn, many of them, of.pmc 
Unfortunately this has not been thc CRSC. 
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ambition, unjust, and often conducted mith small repmi to the 
dictates of humanity. What wc can say with safety is, that  the 
general tendency of her policy has more and more Ieancd in the pro- 
gress of years towards thc elimination of all that is tyrannical and 
nnjust in the government and laws a t  home, and endeavouring f o  
Secure abroad respect for treaties, justice for tho weak and rclicf for 
emlaved peoples. We stated that R nation to attain durable prc- 
cminencc, must necessarily fulfil four conditions. England in modcril 
times has more than any other nation fulfilled such conditions. 
1st. The rigour of her race has been shonm in such manifold imys 
it would bo superfluous to illustrate it. 2nd. The stability of h- 
institutions, or what is the same, their perfcctibilitj-, KC SEC in  our 
0n-n day, in tho qniet n-orhing of the constitution, the loj-nlty to the 
throne, the discipline and good spirit of her armed forcc. 3rd. The 
moral and educational adrancement of thc nation has been conspicuous, 
although in the general sprcad of intelligence, tcmperancc and 
economy among the masses she fall behind some other peoples. 
4th. She has laboured persistentlj- a t  tho development of licr resources, 
and, while distancing on the seas all other nations in tho mriety and 
value of her commerce, she is behindnonc in diligent turning to 
account of the Fast mineral wealth which lies beneath her feet. 
Previous to thc reign of Xasimilian 
tho First, tho Germanic empire was subject to all tho disorders 01 
tho feudal govcrnmcnts. The general diets of the states \\-ere 
tumultuous, and their constant mars mith each other kept the wliolc 
in anarchy and barbarism. Albert the Second divided Germany 
into six circles, each regulated by its omn diet ; but the jealousies 
of thc states prompted them constantly to hostilities, which there m s  
no superior pomcr sufficient to restrain. A t  length Jlasimilim the 
First procured in 1500 n solemn enactment, which cstablishcd n 
perpetual peaceamong the Germanic states, under tho penalty of the 
aggressor being ‘ eonsidercd a common enemy. His regulations, 
homerer miso, mould probably have failed of their end but for the 
influence of the House of Austria, which for thrce centuries occupied 
the Imperial Throne. The ambition of Charles the Fifth n-onld 
ham been dangerous to the freedom of tho German Princes, had not 
the new sxstcm of preserving the balance of p o m r  in Europe 
madc theso princes find allies and protectors sufficient to trarersc the 
Emperor’s schemes of absolute dominion. He attained, however, 
an authority far beyond that of his predecessors. His successors 
wished to imitate his policy, but not having his talents, fonnd yet 
stronger obstacles to their cncroacliment on thc freedom of the states. 
The Germanic liberties were settled for the last time by the treaty 
of Westphalia in 1645, which fixed tho Emperor’s prerogatives, and the 
privileges of the states. This constitution v*as not framed for the 
ordinary ends of government, tho prosperity and happiness of thc 
people. It regarded not thc rights of the subjects, but only the 
independence of the several princes. I t s  sole object was to maintain 
each in the enjoyment of his sovcrcigntj-, and prevent usurpations of 
each other’s territories. It had no relation to the particular 
TO tarn now to Germany. 
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gorernmcnts of the states, cach of mhich had its ovin 1a-m and 
constitution, EOms more frec and others morc despotic. Throughout 
its history thc weakness of Germany was caused by the politicd 
factions and quarrels of its princes, and the contending sects of thc 
Catholics, Luthcrns,  and Calvinists. Ferdinand attempted to 
reconcile these factions and unite the thrcc religions, but in vab. 
Then a civil war of thirty years’ duration reduced tho empirc to 
extremity. At last, by the treaty of Westphalh, all disputes KCM 
settlcd between the contending princes and tho contending religions. 
This salutarypeacc laid the foundation of the future greatness and 
prosperity of Germany. 
The principal crents which in thc end ~ T C  led to the absorption of 
nearly the whole of German speaking people into a great empire, werc 
the influence obtained by Prussia under the leadcrship of Frederick 
the Great, thus bringing her into successful riralry with Austria; 
then the violent usurpations of Napoleon mhich for amhilc united all 
Germany against France, thus s h o h g  That a power thc German 
states could develope when combined, nnd finally what we witnessed 
but the other day-the contest for supremacy bet-ireen Austria and 
Prussia, and the .violent blending by the lattcr victorious kingdom of 
the minor statcs into one empirc, under thc hegemony of Prussia. 
When v e  ask why has Germany not pLayed a yet largcr part in the 
council of the nations than she has done, the answer is of coursc to 
be found in the contending fwtions which for ever disputed in her 
midst. From the like eausc wc remember Greece failed throughout 
lier history, until absorbed in Macedonia, to realize the influence she 
would othenrisc have acquired through the escellenec of many of thc 
nationalities composing it. Pmssia seems destined to play the part of 
another Blacedonia. Germany, or rather the agglomeration of rival 
states called the Germanic Confederation, scarcely fulfilled the con- 
ditions essential to her maintaining & pcrmancnt political or military 
pre-eminence. Vigorous thc rncc certainly is, and German honesty, 
patiencc, and laboriousness arc proverbial ; and these qualities tend to 
give them disciplined troops mhich are nlrmys formidable in the field. 
But one fatal blot, as we h v o  seen, has sufficed to mar their progress 
as a people. How can Ke apply thc term “stability ” or  “perfecti- 
“ bility of institutions ” to a federation of small governments, cach 
ruling accord to its o m  idca, which was almost nlmays morc or less 
that of an absolute tenurc of power, and all held together by a com- 
pact liable to be broken at any timc through the ambition of the morc 
poirerful states of the union, or through intrigues from without ? 
Norc especially hoK could any compact be really LL union when 
rcligious differences created such dissensions as that forcign powers 
were inritcd t o  join in fighting on onc side or  thc other ? 
As regards moral and intellectual progress, it is impossible to 
deny that the Germans have highcr claims than any other ‘as an 
intellectual people, as a nation bent on the pursuit of lino&dge, and 
bringing thereto a degree of patient investigation which has bccn 
r i d l e d  in no other European country. If x-ic look at the moral side, 
so  far as morals relate to social manners and customs, they stand 
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perhaps as high as any people; but when irc lookat tho progress made, 
and the development of national freedom, me find little indeed iras 
accomplished in thc C O U ~ S C  of a long sequence of centuries. 
That the German states ever &reloped their industries, and 
assumed a high position as a commercial people, cannot be said. Tho 
same causc-th absence of freedom-irhich blighted their political 
a nromth, ncccssarily interfered with the development of their resources. 
so that we scc that this popdons country, inhabited by a MCC inferior 
to none, and occupying a magnificent geographical position, fell mani- 
festly short of the destiny to which it might haavc aspired. But  not- 
Idlistanding that it did not reach the highest standard, yet il-hcn 
come to consider its place in thc scale of nations as a warme people, 
and remember thc manifold disadrantages under which they laboured, 
mc arc compclled to concede to the Germans thc justice of their claim 
to high renown. 
7Vc shall not, pcrhqps, bc far wrong in saying that, aftcr England, 
France has throughout her history ranked nest, whether mo consider 
her political or military influence. Having regard to tho homoge- 
neousness of her population, the resources of her soil, and her geogra- 
phical position, nearer to the centre of European life, and haring a 
western and southern seaboard, she ought to have mnde a yet larger 
figurc in thc v-orld for good than England. Let us glance a moment 
at her history. 
Wespoke of the magnificent empire of Charlcmape, and of its 
collapse after his death through the ~ r e a h c s s  of his successors, when 
Germany and France became sundered, and tho latter country dwindled 
to a shadow. The energy which shc t h r m  into thc conduct of thc 
Holy Wars restored somewhat her reputation. It is strange, when me 
consider the absolute rule of a long line of Bourbon kings, that in  the 
early times thc royal prerogxtiro should have been so extremely 
limited. The Government under the Xerovingian kings was most 
democratieal. It was only in timo of war and for purposes of disei- 
pline that a dictatorship mas conferred provisionally on thc king, and 
the regal dignity in time of peace nas a mere shadoil-. Under the 
third Capetian race the crown acquired more weight, and a proper 
spirit T T ~ S  exerted in restraining the pomer and punishing the out- 
rages of the nobles. The chief power of tho State began now to shift 
to the scale of the monarch. The national assembly interfered rather 
to ratify than to decree, and in the fifteenth century the right of legis- 
lation seems to have resided mholly in  the crown. The right of taxa- 
tion followed of course, and the assemblies mero now rarely convened, 
and from the reign of Louis the Eighteenth cntircly laid aside. But 
another power gilrdnally arose in the State, which in some measure 
supplied their function in limiting the royal prerogative. The parlia- 
ments inm originally nothing more than chief courts of jnsticc. The 
parliament of Paris took the lead, and thc nation gmduallj- began to 
regard it as a body mhich shared the p o ~ c r s  of government Kith the 
monarch, and in later reigns it Trould occasionally oppose any arbitrary 
stretch of authoritj- by refusing to registcr the king's cdiets. Thc 
sovereigns of France were thereforc to be considered as absolute 
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monarchs, but mhose authority was in  some small degree limited hy 
what had come to be considered the regulations of the State. History 
shon-s us that if absolute sovereigns, whcn wise and beneficent, arc 
capable of conferring rast  benefits on their people, that  rulers of this 
kind arc rarelyfound. Femmen arc able to withstand the temptations 
which xait  on the possession of D po\rerful and mresisted will. The 
kings of France formed no exception to this Ian-. While in Englancl 
the people soon began to grow restire under unusual restraints, the 
French more or less complacently g a w  themselves through a succes- 
sion of monarchs to work all their d d  schemes of ambition. Not 
even the kindly rule of Francis thegirst, or of Henry the Fourth, who 
had brought his kingdom from a miserable state of anarchy to high 
prosperity and splendour, and whose whole attention was giren to 
improving the condition of his subjects, reforming the laws and rccon- 
ciling religious claims, sufficed to arouse the people to assert du r ing  
the misqrable reigns which fol lo~~ed their claim to haw a voice in the 
government of themselres. 
When we come to consider horr far France has fulfilled the concli- 
tions which wait upon a lasting pre-cmincnce in politics and war, -m 
find that as regards vigour of race they h v o  ansri-ercd throughout 
their history to the accounts we have of them from Cccsar, notwith- 
standing' all the foreign admixtures of population since that time. 
They were distinguished by the early historians for  the instability of 
their character, irarlilie aptitude, disregard of truth and treaties, their 
anterprising nature, their fierceness, their fieklencss. Who 11-ill say 
that with all thc noble and chiralrous qunlitics distinguishing the 
France of modern times, the portraiture of the ancient annalists does 
not hold good eren to-day ? As regards their institutions, we shhll 
not err if we say that the misgovcrnmcnt of France through centuries 
crippled the poi\-er and misdirected the energies of the people. What 
was the rcat Rerolution but the tardy, and terrible, national protest 
effected throughout the xorld by that rerolution, yet in e d s  brought 
about in the country itself, and from which it seems destined ncwr 
permanently to recorer, we see very clearly I iov grndqnl must be any 
development for good w-hich is to bc permanent, and horn deadly must 
have bccn the eril xdiich the rerolution was intended to orcrcome 
when it induecd so many in its train. 
That France hns ahpq-s occupied a foremost place in the march of 
intellect may safely be affirmed ; but as regards the moral side, the 
naturally material tendency of thc people n-as not likely to find 
counteracting agencies uudcr successivcly bad govcrnmcnts ; and 
when tho revolution broke out-since it ~ r n s  directed to the upsctting 
of all that is called order, los,nlty, morality, religion--a school arose 
of free thinkers and shallow philosophers, who have striven to pcr- 
pctuatc a belief in materialism, and have gone a long way in under- 
mining those moral principles which are a t  the foundation of alk 
stable institutions, and measured ndrance to a reasonablc and sober 
freedom. That France has dedopcd her resources during the reigns 
of her kings, as she might hare done under bcttcr auspices, cannot be 
against t f e misgorernment of ages ? And much as has bccn thc good 
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affirmed. Shc lagged duping that time far behind England, though 
having many greatcr natural adrantages. She had, hoivevcr, the vast 
adrantage over Germany of bcing a united people, and to o great 
extent she turned this advantap to account. Consequently, as 
regards her political and military influence, shc must be considercd, 
if not to rank bcforc England, yet to hold a plncc bcfore Gcrmnnj-. 
To turn now to cmnpnigns and the practice of the battlc ficld-inno- 
rations in tactics brought about in the course of time-innovations of 
armament-may modify the force of an armq-, but will not changc its 
characteristics. For instance, the armies which by thcir impetuous 
brnverx achieved success when success depended morc on the personal 
proivess and strength of thc individual soldicr, xould certainly lose in 
power when skill rather than forward heroism is requircd, unless they 
bad also cnlisted that clcmcnt in their favour. Sir William Codrington 
most judiciously obscrvcd, some short time back, that " amidst a11 the 
'' speculations, the maps, and the theories, fighting, good hard fighting, 
'' would remain a sterling clcmcnt of success ;" and, perhaps, at a time 
when KC aro somewhat disposed to look npon war as a science, ratlicr 
than "as a drama full of passion," tho caution is necdcd. On the 
other hand, that army which is not up to the high mark which recent 
innovations in tactics and armament have rendered necessary, mill be 
likely to fiud in tho strcss of trial its highest efforts of heroism 
nnavailing. The history of reccnt xmrs conspicuously demonstrates 
that science and art-conragc being cqud-will render succcss almost 
a mathematical ccrtaintx. 
If French armies have always bccn remarkablc for their &n, 
English for their solidity, G c m n  for their discipline, Rnssian 
for their tenacity, Turkish for their fanatical disregard of dmgw, 
but though such qualities Tere instrumental in  the past for sccuring 
for each of thcse successes, and will probably be always characteristic 
of their armies, yet every successim war teachcs us that moral and 
physical excellence will not alone snfficc. And so complicated bccomcs 
cocry day thc great problem of war, that whatever the merits of 
soldiers phFsically and morally, tho con-i-iction is forced upon us that 
not only intelligent dircction of the whole, but the intelligent dircctiou 
of a forcc which is itself i n t e l l i~en t  and highly-instructed, mill bc ncccs- 
snry to the army of any nation aspiring to be in  the front rank of ~ a r .  
IEeturning, horcrer, to an earlier time, mc cannot fail to recognisc 
that tho qualitics n-c witness in them !o-day characteriscd thc soldiers 
of thc armies of Europc a t  a very early period. 
Thc Crusades shorn us the impetuous and domineering disposition of 
thc French, fighting in thc same causo viith, but orcrposcring bj- 
their supcrior cncrgy, their Italian allies. TVc notiec also their want 
of snstaincd effort in carrying through thc entcrpriso. We scc thc 
Germans honcstly contributing their share,of courage and of blood-but 
somewhat slowcr and morc methodical in their action ; TOO witness tho 
sturdy perserering battle of our Richard Cmur-&-Lion and his English 
followers, and their faithfulness to the cause they had embraced. 
When me look a t  thc agc of chivalry and rornanco which sprang 
out of and follomed thc Crusades, xvo find the French remarkable for 
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thcir success in  a kind of fighting admirably suited to the national 
character. 
The long wars between England and France, during which Park 
X ~ S  held by an English garrison for eighteen years ; an English L i z  
crowned a t  Rheims ; and parts of France held for as much as three 
hundred years ; demonstrate the supcriority which solidity combined 
with skill possesses owr enthusiasm and numbers. The povier of 
tho English resided not only in their sterling courage but in their 
pcculiar skill as archers ; but it \\-as tho coolnes~ and solidity of their 
troops mhich enabled them to excel as archers on a battle-field. The 
French may have been equally skilful as archers, but their tempera. 
ment, ever inclining them to restless action, unfitted them to succeed 
mhcn in the hour of battle a steady hand and calm nerve mere required : 
and at  this moment x e  believe it to be incontestible that the late 
improrcments in the infantry arm have all tended to gim additional 
pokers to those troops of xrhatcver nation who arc more distinguished 
for their discipline and their waiting courage than for their more 
nrdcnt qualities. Throughout tho wars waged bctmecn France and 
England since the introduction of gunpowder, the fire of English 
infantry has been prowrbial for its excellence; mhcrcas vie 310 not 
detracting from the other superlative qualities of the French, when 
ire say that their musket fire has invariably fallen short of what it 
should have been, through thcir unsteadiness or rather through their 
undue eagcrness. I f  battles arc usually decided by the infantry, what 
a share must good firing have in the rcsult ! 
Though the English, as we said, held largo parts of Fmncc in their 
power for  so long, yet ~ r a s  the French nation endowed with too high, 
noble, and heroic qualities for it to be possible for it to be permanently 
enslaved! and we find that n-ith sudden Tiolcnco “they broke the 
“ sokc from of€ their neck.” 
The inherent solidity of English armies has been remrlrably shown 
in the mars conducted on the continent, where from not  being able 
usually to scnd forth an army composed entirely of British troops in 
numbers suflicient, England has allied herself with other powers. An 
army composed of various contingents is necessnrily not so easily led 
as that of a single povrer, nor is tho fighting of each contingent 
apacity.the same. W e  need not suppose that on all occasions when 
England 3nd her allies haTe met defeat on the battle-field that had 
the force been entirely composed of British troops they  odd not also 
Iia7,~o met the same fate. But tho fact remains that in some of tho 
notable victories of the French, such aa Fontenoy, Raueanx, Lndeldt, 
and Stcenkeerkc, tho English were o d y a  contingent of the forces 
there beaten. 
There can bo no question of tho csccllencc of German troops, 
whether they be north or south Germans. They have always been 
distinguished for their disciplinc, sober courage, and devotion to 
duty. Wanting the fire and enthusiasm of the French, they h v c  
rarely suffered such wholesale disasters. Truly, if French annals 
are crowded x&h astonishing triumphs, they havc most extraordinary 
disasters to set against these, and diich have becn brought about 
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b~ two causes j want of foresight and temerity in attempting things 
beyond their strength, and the fatal facility with rrhich enthusiasm, 
when sturdily checked, is apt to find Tent in going to an opposite extreme. 
The imnt of national unity in the nation has operated as in other 
U-~J-S against the reputation of tho Germans as soldiers. Not only 
because tho army of one state might fight with less eagcmess than 
that of another, but as each state had its own ideas on all subjects, 
it of course had its o m  way of ordering its militaq affairs, and 
naturally jealousies were apt to arise among the chiefs of each state 
when acting together. Frederick the Great shon-ed how formidable 
the north Germans, as Wallenstein and Monticuculi had shorrn before 
how formidable south Germans, could be mado as soldiers; All these 
remarkable men in their day, like Turcnnc and Xarlborough, and 
Eugene, mere instrumental in bearing high the reputation of the 
troops of their respective nations. Admirable as tacticians in the 
particular school of tactics of their time, they carried the art  possibly 
,as far as it could be carried under tho then conditions of warfare. 
But the day was fast coming when a revolution in  the whole art of 
war was to reveal to an astonished world, that traditions of glory mould 
ranish away, and could becomo an occasion of disnster to those who 
relgng on such had not follovied tho mareti of cotemporary progress. 
WC stated prcriously that unless there is, in a nation, tho disposition 
and the power to take advantage of any access of inflnencc it may 
have attained, the accidental appearance upon tho scene of somo 
great sovereign or remarkable general does not suffice to maintain a 
nation in its prc-eminence. On the other hand, men of ability and 
character have frequently szved their country from disaster, or been 
the means of evoking a spirit in  a nation which will carry it to the con- 
summation of nndcr tahgs  truly wonderful, and which mould have 
seemed to have been far beyond the reach of such people to accomplish. 
Who could have foreseen after Blcnheim and Nalplaquet, after 
Dettingen and Rossbach, that the genius of one man could so improve 
tho fighting pon-ers of the French that they would carry their flag 
triumphant through every continental capital, and show such a front 
of victory as the world despaired of ever seeing broken ! 
Remarkable as the French ever --ere for their readiness to fight, 
and if beaten to begin again ; great as mere their occasional successes 
before Bonoparte’s time, their d u e  as soldiers was never suspected 
till then. That tho generalship of such a chief as Wellington would 
maintain the renown of English tro.ops, could hare litt!e of surprising 
in  it to those who remember what sterling qualities the loadership of 
Marlborough had before enabled them to exhibit on many a victorious 
field. Nerertheless, fern could have anticipated when they saw the 
wonderful ease x-ith which the French defeated all the other nations 
of Europe, that the British troops would reassert their pre-eminence 
on tho battle-field as they did. 
If consummate qualities in thc general of an army, suddenly 
doreloped, are of enormous benefit a t  any rate for the time being to 
the nation he serres, and increases in an incredible degree the ralue of 
the forces hc commands, another clement of succesq in war, and one 
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a lmys obtainablc, is tactical csccllcnce. “ Tactics,” said Napoleon, 
“ should be changed evcry tcn years.” Without examining that point, 
it is sufficient that TC learn how incumbcnt it is on ever>- gy-ernmcnt 
to providc that tho armamcnt of its troops and their tactical 
efficiency, arc on a par vi-ith, o r  in advancc of tho times. History 
teems with examples of the surpriscs which hayo bcen occasioned in 
an army by its finding itsclf opposed to a foe bcttcr armed, bettcr 
drilled, bettcr mancouvrcd than it had espcctcd. Whcn such is tho 
case thc battle is mostly half lost beforc it is commenced; and w r y  
frequently vio find that a little foresight and attention to details wmld 
~ W C  sufliced to h a n  put  matters on ofairfooting. TVithThat viisdom, 
what prcvision, had the Germans provided for the war ~ I l i c h  they 
knew ~vould come, and &ich did come in 1870 ! Horn bad they 
already made good many defects which tho expcricnce of only n. short 
time before had rcvcalcd, existed in thcir arrangcmcnts. What close 
attention thcy had devoted to thc details of the working of caeh 
department ! A nercr-to-be-forgotten lesson, not alone for the French, 
but for all pcoples, was that given in the Pranco-German Jvar. Tho 
lcsson as IYC rcad it is this: that in the times in which TTC live 
traditions of glory go for.very little, if governmcnts and~peoplcs do 
not see tho necessity of accepting and utilising changes a3 they occur 
in thc manner of conducting military operations. 
War is a vastly differcnt business frdm mhat it was but n short timo 
ago. It has beconic the concentrated expression of a nation’s cnergies, 
wealth, scicncc, and manhood. Instead of n-ar being precedcd by pm- 
pnration, thc action of the piece immcdiatcly commences. Tlic theatre 
IS now rcachcd with mingcd speed ; thc best actors arc up in their 
parts ; thcir rehearsals wcre long ago concluded j they only wait the 
risc of the curtain, and they are on thestage! 
The nation that is rich is guilty of suicidal policy if it does not 
devote all the money which may bc requisite to enable it to  maintain 
every portion of its forces in a state of thc highest efficiencF; thc 
military institutions of a people must bc radically defective if they do 
not permit of tho national forces being in such number, and of such 
quality, and so esccllently armed and instructed that they arc 
capablc of a t  oncc representing the mi@ of a nation. TVe have long 
been accustomed to hear that “money is tho sinews of n-ar.” But in  
the sudden and desperate clash of mcapons which vill occur a t  the 
first call of the trumpet to battle, it is the iron and not the gold 
which will tell most. The years of pcace are the time to use tho gold, 
iron will be for tho brief hour of war. 
Therc arc some things which a nation cannot al\$ays command; it 
cannot al~vays make surc of having great generals; neither can it 
always enlist fortunc in its favour; but crcry great nation can make 
surc of Laving an army mhosc organization is good, which is supported 
by adequate rescrres, which has officers well . jnstructecl, =en 
disciplined and Tell es’crciscd, xhieh: has a good systcm of tactics, and 
an armament on o par i\-ith that  of other peoples. 
That nation whose wcalth is the greatest, and -shich has therefore, 
most to defend, has the means of proriding in the most efficient -cay 
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VIRIUTE ET I-ALORE. 531 
for a futurc ~vhose possibilities are boundless. Happy that people 
&o, if it has traditions of glory to fight for! 
We hm-e cndearoured throughout our treatment of the subject, to 
&ere to thc principles we ventured to lay d o n ,  that a nation docs 
not attain lasting prc-eminence in  mr, simply because it has plenty 
of brave men, plenty of intellectual men, because it has a large 
army ire11 drilled and armed; these are all excellent things to 
Lave, and no nation could maintain its high position n-ithont 
them; but history m-illhavebecnmrittcn in vain if it do not teach 
ns that i-ictory may often be snatched by sAi€ul generalship, 
by weight of numbers, by happy display of heroism, by a 
combination of happy accidents, yet that in the long sun the moral 
force nil1 gct the uppcr land. BIoreau said, c c  that proridenee was 
‘‘ al~vays on the side of dense battalions,” ‘‘ but,” obscrrcs Alison, (‘ he 
‘‘ forgot to add, n-hat experience soon taught his countrS,’that it is tile 
L L  moral l a m  of nature which in  the end determine on which side the 
L‘dcnse battalions arc to be found.” In  other words, that nation 
which is gradually progressing in national freedom, d i c h  posscsscs 
perfectible institutions, that people which is attached to its govcrn- 
mcnt, which is occupied in the industries nppropriatc to  the 
resources and productions of their country, whose military spirit is 
kept alive b~ the recollection of what has becn done in the pist, in 
the achievement and maintcnancc of its indepcndencc, which cannot 
le t  its military institutions lag behind when crerything else is pro- 
gressing, such nation, appreciating its position and its duties, is that 
 hose csistencc and whose glory is sccurcd by its 0111 action. In  
thns presenting D perfect ideal of the situation in which every great 
nation should be which pspires to maintain its placc, v-e do not mean 
to say that our o m  or a n j  other has rcachcd the height of that ideal. 
But  that people is the most secure which makes such ideal the aim of 
its persistent efforts. Let us remember that “war far from being an 
L g  exact science is a terrible and passioned drama, regulated it is true 
,‘by three or four general principles, but also dependent for its results 
‘‘ upon a number of moral and physical complications, and the moral 
6‘ qualities, the talents, the executive foresight and abilits, the greatness 
‘i of character of the leaders, and tho impulsc, sympathies, and pxssions 
g L  of the mnsscs hare a great iq0uencc upon it.” On which side is it 
probable that the moral qualities, the high character of thc leaders, 
the derotion of the follon-crs will be found ? Is it not in that army 
which proceeds from a nation, loyal to its gomrnmcnt, attached to its 
institutions, obedient to its laws, and occnpicd in the dcdopmcnt of 
its wealth and strength ? 
J3istx-y teaches us this great truth, that not the genius which 
illumined the supreme warfare of Hannibal; not the vigour which 
characterised the daring sciciicc of Czsar; neither the tenacious courage 
that accompnnied the cautions tactics of Wellington ; nDr the lumi. 
nous conceptions which struck out the grand s t ra teg  of Xapolcon ; 
-not all of these united in one chief would atonc to a people in the 
long ruq for the lack within itself of that moral force which uses its 
prospcrity for progress, and out of adversity regathers purpose for 
higher endearour. 
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [U
niv
ers
ity
 O
f M
ary
lan
d]
 at
 09
:01
 14
 O
cto
be
r 2
01
4 
